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The Internet has evolved into a worldwide information backbone with vast user
base. Internet users are diverse and they receive varying utilities from their network
connections. In many cases high-level user decisions appear to have direct conse-
quences on the network performance. In this thesis, our motivation is to characterize
the effects of user behaviors in terms of lower layer network metrics such as network
latency. We consider the Content Delivery Networks for our analysis, since they are
the interconnection of network elements at the application layer and thus are directly
affected by the user preferences.
It has been a common practice to use caches to store the most popular data in order
to improve user latency and reduce the network load. Recently, a more systematic
approach to the caching has been developed in the framework of Content Delivery
Networks. Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) are the networks of caches that are
distributed throughout the Internet serving user requests directed to their subscriber
web sites (publishers). They distribute the publisher’s original content intelligently to
the caching servers (surrogates) all over the world. Users receive their information from
the surrogates, which are closer and usually much less loaded than the origin server.
The objective is to minimize the user latency by intelligently distributing the content
and serving the user requests from the most efficient surrogates. We use price-directed
market based algorithms to achieve this goal. As it is the case in the current Internet,
we model the agents with a selfish self-maximizing behavior and define the problem
as a non-cooperative game played among the publishers and the surrogates. We show
that the system has an equilibrium and if this equilibrium is unique, even though
the agents are non-cooperative we achieve the global optimum. We also determine a
uniqueness condition, which states that if the publishers are not willing to pay high
amounts and the cache sizes are sufficiently small, then the equilibrium is unique. We
noticed that the global system optimum that minimizes total average user latency
requires the publishers to make very high investments, which in practice may prohibit
the applicability of the distributed market method. Thus, we consider an investment
strategy, which leads to a near-optimum system solution at much lower investments.
The abovementioned method gives publishers infinite granularity to determine their
quality of service. Next, we investigated the case where the publishers can offer only
finite number of QoS classes. In this model, surrogate partitions its total capacity
among different service classes and among each class publishers receive equal shares of
the resources. In our model, publishers try to get as large cache space as possible, while
the surrogate is required to achieve fair allocation among the publishers. Specifically,
each publisher should be charged the same if they receive equal share of caching
space. We determine the optimal pricing strategy of the surrogate maximizing its
revenue. We also analyzed the competition among two surrogates under this model
and determined the condition that leads to a Nash equilibrium. We showed that at
equilibrium surrogates peer as if they are a single combined surrogate server.
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Internet has gained an important place in our lives by enabling us to reach any in-
formation anytime and anywhere we want. From its early stages as an experimen-
tal network (ARPANET) connecting defense and academic institutions, Internet has
grown exponentially in dimensionality and user traffic. This growth has resulted in
congestion over the network links and excruciating end-user delays while downloading
the information. Caches and proxies are installed to alleviate the congestion on the
network links and the delays associated with them. Caches and proxies together store
information closer to the users and serve the user requests on behalf of the corre-
sponding servers. Although caches and proxies have been successful in alleviating the
congestion, they are basically best-effort solutions to the more important problem of
content distribution in the Internet. The objective of content distribution problem is
to determine the best location between the original source and client for the content
to be delivered. This problem has been investigated for the past couple of decades
not only in the context of web content delivery but also in the context of file storage
in large scale file systems. Recently, Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) have been
developed to solve this problem.
In the following, we first review the past research in the area of content delivery,
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especially in the context of web access. We also review the current efforts in integrat-
ing price-based user-centric network control. This topic has received much attention
recently, since it promises to migrate the control of the network to the edges, and thus
reducing the complexity of the network. Furthermore, by using certain incentives, the
users can be differentiated and the most efficient resource allocation can be achieved.
In Chapter 2, we describe the content distribution and its more practical counter-
part content delivery problems. Unlike the content distribution problem, the content
delivery problem maximizes the total web server utility by efficiently distributing the
content and routing the user requests to the most suitable caches in the network.
We develop a distributed algorithm for efficient dissemination and routing by price-
oriented market-based resource allocation schemes. In Chapters 3 and 4, we analyze
the operation of the distribution and routing sub-problems. In Chapter 5, we analyze
the possibility of best-effort QoS by nonlinear pricing mechanisms.
1.1 Internet Content Delivery
1.1.1 World Wide Web Overview
The ease of use of World Wide Web (WWW) applications such as Microsoft’s In-
ternet Explorer and Netscape has facilitated the revolution in the communications.
Common users can now access the network and retrieve any type of information they
wish. Users employ an agent that is called browser, which displays to the user the
requested information and provides numerous configuration and navigational features.
In WWW, the information is available in the form of a web page. A web page is a
collection of web objects. An object is a file such as an HTML (Hyper Text Markup
Language) file, a JPEG or GIF image, a Java applet, an audio clip, etc. The base
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HTML page references the other objects in the page with the objects’ Uniform Re-
souce Locator, or URL in short. The URL uniquely defines the location of an object
in human-understandable format. URL consists of two parts: host name and the di-
rectory, and the name of the object in the host computer where the object resides. A
web server stores the web objects, each addressable by an URL.
Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the communications protocol used be-
tween web applications. HTTP defines the structure of the messages and how these
messages are exchanged between the servers and the users during the transfer of the
web pages. HTTP is an application level protocol that use reliable TCP (Transport
Control Protocol) as an underlying transport layer protocol. In order for an HTTP
client to initiate a TCP connection with the server, the client requires the IP address
of the server itself. In HTTP, the servers are assigned alphanumeric names for ease
of use for the human users. These names are associated with IP addresses, where the
objects pointed by the URLs reside. At the beginning of a HTTP connection, the user
first determines the IP address of the server from the server’s URL. This is done by
Internet directory service called Domain Name Server (DNS). The details of the DNS
is discussed in the later sections. TCP connection between the client and the server
provides reliable data transfer between the two parties.
HTTP can use both non-persistent and persistent connections. With a non-
persistent connection, each object referenced by the main HTML page is delivered
to the user by a separate TCP connection. The server tears down the TCP connec-
tion after sending the requested object. However, these connections can be set up
in parallel. With persistent connections, the server leaves the TCP connection open
after sending the requests. Subsequent requests and responses between the same client
and the server can be sent over the same connection. Consequently, the delay due to
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three-way handshake for multiple TCP connection set up can be avoided.
1.1.2 Internet Caching
With explosive growth of demand for Internet services, the network traffic has in-
creased exponentially. As the load exceeded the network capacity, network congestion
and server overloading become common phenomena resulting in increased traffic de-
lays. Web caches are developed and implemented to reduce the traffic congestion and
the latency. Web caches are located between Web servers (or origin servers) and users,
and satisfies HTTP requests on behalf of the servers. Web cache has its own storage
space and keeps in this storage copies of the recently requested objects. In case an-
other request for the same object is received, the request is immediately satisfied by
the cache avoiding the transfer of document from the distant original server.
Caches reduce latency by responding to the user requests from a closer location
compared to the original servers. They also reduce the network traffic, since each
popular object is requested from the original server only once (during lifetime of the
object), after which the cache satisfies all future requests for the same object. Another
advantage of web caching is the rapid deployment of content. As the web caches
get widely-deployed, the content providers with popular data but without high-speed
connections to the Internet, will be able to distribute their information to the users
rapidly through these caches.
Web caching can be divided in three categories according to the location of the
caches. The most common form of caching is done at the client side. The client-side
caches store the most popular pages on the client’s computer. Most of the modern
browsers have this capability. The browser cache is useful for only the client and
as long as the client continues to browse a web site which has multiple pages with
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common objects. The main objective of the browser cache is to reduce the object
retrieval latency.
Another type of caching used in the Internet is the server-side caching. In server-
side caching an accelerator cache is located in front of one or more web servers. If the
requested object is found in the cache, the accelerator returns the object, otherwise the
request is routed to a back-end (origin) server. Server-based caching (or also called the
reverse proxy) is implemented to avoid the overloading of the web servers. Reference
[10] considers the problem of caching multiple web servers at a given location. The
objective is to minimize the fraction of the requests forwarded to the back-end servers
from the accelerator subject to fixed storage space. The paper models the problem
as constrained-maximization problem and obtains the solution by Lagrange multiplier
theorem.
Both client-side and server-side caching provide little help in alleviating the In-
ternet congestion and server load. For this reason a third type of caching, the proxy
caching is introduced. The proxy caches are placed between the clients and the orig-
inal servers. They are implemented by the content providers, the enterprises or the
ISPs. ISPs and enterprises implement proxies to reduce the WAN bandwidth without
degrading the user performance. Content providers implement proxies to serve the
user requests more rapidly and to avoid the overloading of the main server with large
numbers of requests. Initial proxy servers that were implemented acted as the mirrors
of the origin servers, where complete content was replicated.
The effectiveness of a proxy depends on its location. A web proxy located in
a wrong place does little to improve the system performance. Finding the optimal
placement of web proxies in a network like the Internet is a challenging if not an
impossible task. Most existing proxies are placed in prominent locations such as the
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routers for the LANs, ISPs’ gateways, etc. The optimal location of web proxies depend
on the user traffic and the network state. The determination of the best proxy locations
in a network was investigated in [55], [56]. In [55] and [56], the authors explored the
optimal placement of the multiple web proxies among potential sites, so that the overall
user latency is minimized under a given traffic pattern. They showed that the optimal
placement of proxies among potential sites in a linear or ring topology can be modeled
as a dynamic programming problem.
The servers may install their own proxy caches or share the caches of the CDNs. Re-
cently, the interest in CDNs has flourished due to the success of such CDNs as Akamai
[93], MirrorImage [94], DigitalIsland [95], etc. These companies provide caching ser-
vices for web servers. They are appropriately called content providers. Their promise
is to improve the user performance significantly without having the content providers
make huge investments in the mirror sites. Such a promise is made possible by many
caching servers geographically dispersed all over the globe. These caching servers se-
lectively cache documents from the host web content providers and use this content
to serve user requests locally with less latency.
1.1.3 Cooperative and Hierarchical Caching
Multiple web caches placed at different locations in the Internet may cooperate and
improve overall performance. For example, an institutional cache can be configured to
send its HTTP requests to a cache in a backbone ISP at the national level. When the
object is not available at the institutional cache, the request can be forwarded to the
national cache. If the requested object is available in the national cache, it is served;
otherwise the request is forwarded to the original server. The benefit of the hierarchi-
cal caching architectures is that higher-level caches have larger user population and
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therefore higher hit rates.
The cooperation among the web cache sharing is first proposed in the context of
the Harvest project [24]. An example of cooperative caching system is the NLANR
[90] which consists of a number of backbone caches in the US providing service to
institutional and regional caches. The caches obtain objects from each other using
HTTP and ICP (Internet Caching Protocol). The Harvest group designed the ICP
that supports discovery and retrieval of documents from neighboring caches. Today,
ICP is widely used by institutions and countries that has established hierarchies of
proxy caches which cooperate to reduce traffic to the Internet backbone.
Even if ICP is the de-facto standard for inter-cache communications, the large
messaging overhead associated with the cache cooperation makes ICP unsuitable for
wide-scale deployment for the web proxies. In ICP, a proxy cache discovers the content
of other proxies by multicasting a query message to all other proxies whenever a cache
miss occurs. Thus, as the number of proxies increases, both the communications
and the processing costs increase dramatically. This query/reply exchange introduces
additional delay as well. However, since the caches can process ICP queries very
quickly, the delay is mainly due to the round-trip delay between the caches. The delay
caused by the ICP depends on the caches’ proximity to each other. Another deficiency
of the ICP is its inability to deliver the objects to users from the optimal sites. An ICP
proxy retrieves the object from the cache that has responded first to the inquiry. ICP
does not consider the bandwidth available for the connection between the caches or
the network states. Thus, it may be possible to retrieve the object from a cache, but
that is located closer to the inquiring cache, which has low available bandwidth while
there may be another cache which is located farther but has a high bandwidth link
[22]. It is shown [73], [24], [26] that the use of ICP in a WAN creates large message
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overhead and causes large additional retrieval delays. Often, users are better off by
requesting the object directly from the original server.
Several alternatives have been proposed to address this problem, e.g. Cache Ar-
ray Routing Protocol (CARP), Summary Cache, Cache Digest. CARP is specifically
designed for clusters of caches implemented in a LAN environment, where multiple
caches are placed mainly for scalability purposes. Often a single cache is not sufficient
to handle the traffic or provide for the necessary storage space. Multiple caches share
the load and provide a larger storage space. The problem of determining to which
cache the user request should be forwarded to is then solved by CARP(Cache Array
Routing Protocol) [91]. In CARP, URL space is partitioned by the help of hash func-
tions. The proxy server or the client browser with CARP uses the destination URL of
the user request in a hash function to determine the cache that the request should be
forwarded to. When every user browser uses the same hash function, an object will
never be present in more than one cache in the cluster. Unfortunately, this method
is not appropriate for sharing caching resources in a WAN, since the caches have to
coordinate the selection of the hash function. Such a coordination may be infeasible
due to the limited network bandwidth among the proxies. Furthermore the network
distance between the proxies and their users is usually non-homogeneous. However,
CARP forwards the user requests only with respect to the destination URL, so some
of the web objects may experience much higher retrieval delays.
Another proposal for this problem was given by two research groups simultaneously
but independently: The Summary Cache [26] from University of Wisconsin and the
Cache Digest [73] from NLANR. The proposed solution in both cases is to keep a
summary of the contents of the neighboring proxy caches at each proxy. Thus, an
incoming request is forwarded to a cache containing the requested object without
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requiring a search for the object among the peered caches every time the object is
requested. To keep the amount of information stored/transferred by the proxies low
a technique called Bloom filters is suggested. The drawback of this technique is the
possibility of false hits for the objects in the neighboring caches. That is, a user request
can be forwarded to a neighboring cache even though that object is not stored there.
However, numerical studies have shown that this technique can achieve comparable
hit rates with reduced overall traffic and user latency compared to ICP [73].
Adaptive Web Caching [66] takes the idea of keeping the state of the neighboring
caches one step further, and proposes URL routing. The idea is to forward the user
request to a nearby cache which has high probability of having the requested object.
However, in order to minimize the delay in the case of a miss, the request must be
routed to a cache that is also closer to the origin server. Web caches maintain a
URL routing table which is similar to IP routing table. The URL table’s main key
is the URL prefixes, with which one or more identifiers to the next-hop caches are
associated. The information in the table includes a URL prefix, an identifier for the
cache where the object is stored, and a metric reflecting that cache’s average measured
delay in seconds to retrieve a request from a matching URL. Such a system may be
attractive for forwarding the requests of a few popular web sites, however this solution
is not scalable. The amount of information that needs to be stored/transferred for
large numbers of URLs seems prohibitive. Furthermore, the HTTP requests have to
be constructed at the routers to determine the URLs of the pages, which may result
in large processing delays.
LSAM project [78], and WebCanal [57] investigated the use of multicast channels
to effectively deliver common information to distributed proxy caches. The LSAM
(Large Scale Active Middleware) is a project on automatic distribution of Web pages
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to proxy servers. Its proxy cache server tracks the requests and determines the com-
mon interests of the proxy caches. The proxy cache server forms multiple multicast
channels according to these interests. Whenever a user request that belongs to one of
these channels is received by the original server, the reply is sent to all proxy caches
that are subscribed to that channel. By this way, the web pages are pushed to the
clients anticipatively according to the requests of the peer proxy caches. When a user
requests one of these pages, the page is already in the cache and can be served to the
user immediately. Web Canal [57] generalizes this idea and suggests to use multicast
channel not only for web page delivery but also for other push-based applications.
Cache Update Policies
Cache buffer sizes are limited and not all objects can be stored at every proxy. Thus,
caches should try to store the most appropriate objects. The simplest and the most
common approach to cache management is the LRU (Least Recently Used) algorithm,
which removes the least recently accessed objects from the cache until there is sufficient
space for the new object. The advantage of this algorithm is its simplicity. In fact,
many current actual production cache engines and browser caches use some variation
of this algorithm. However, one of the main weaknesses of LRU is that the cache can
be flooded by objects that are referenced only once, flushing out objects with higher
probability of being reused. The authors of [45] observed that the probability of an
object being referenced again quickly grows after the second reference. Another widely
implemented cache update policy is the Least Frequently Used (LFU). By disposing
off the objects that are least frequently accessed, LFU avoids the shorthcoming of the
LRU; however, LFU does not remove old objects with large reference counts from the
cache, which result in cache pollution. An aging policy is often used to cope with this
10
problem.
The objective of cache management is to reduce latency and traffic. Due to the
high variability and the complex structure of the Internet, achieving optimal solutions
with respect to these objectives is almost impossible. For this reason, in the context
of web caching several performance measures have been introduced. Three popular
performance measures used in web caching are hit rate (HR), byte hit rate (BHR),













where hi is the number of hit references to document i, ri is the total number of
references to document i, si size of the document i, and di is the delay time to fetch
document i from the original server to the cache. HR is the traditional measure for
caching systems, and represents the number of hit references over the total number of
references. BHR represents the number of bytes saved from retransmissions by using
the cache over the total amount of bytes referenced. While BHR considers the size of
the document, it does not consider the difference in retrieval costs. Among documents
that are of the same size, those with higher retrieval costs should be kept in the cache.
DSR is the measure that considers this issue.
The related research focused on determining an appropriate performance measure
(e.g HR, BHR, etc) and optimizing the system with respect to this measure, so that
the main objective of maximizing the throughput and minimizing the user latency
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is also met. A good summary of web caching algorithms can be found in [4]. Sev-
eral algorithms such as LRU, LFU, SIZE [83], HYBRID [84], LNC-R-W3 [75] have
attempted to optimize performance for a particular measure. The weakness of each
of these algorithms is their inability to adjust to new network and objective situa-
tions since they are designed for a single performance measure. More complicated
algorithms such as Greedy-Dual-Size [15], LRV [60], sw-LFU [49], and LUV [4] have
arbitrary objective functions which are not built into the cache replacement policy.
The motivation for such algorithms is the need to provide different service levels to
different content providers. Some servers will have clients who are much less tolerant
to delay and are willing to pay for a higher quality of service. Some servers may be
quite constrained in their network connections and thus may value off-loading traffic
to a network cache. Basically what these algorithms do is that they assign a weighting
function to each object in the cache. This weighting function has several parameters
that can be adjusted to fit user needs. When needed, the algorithms replace the object
that has the smallest weight. For example LUV algorithm uses a weight that is the
retrieval cost of an object per unit size.
Recently Kelly et al. [50] discussed the user-centric design of web caching replace-
ment algorithms. The authors explored a scenario in which the content providers
reveal to a shared cache the value they receive from the hits to their objects. The
authors proposed the Value Hit Rate (VHR) measure, which is a generalization of
BHR measure. The servers associate each object i with a weight Wi to indicate the
value they receive per byte when i is served from the cache. VHR metric is defined as
V HR =
∑
hits Wi × sizei∑
requests Wi × sizei
The drawback of such user-centered algorithms is that the servers may misreport
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their valuations to receive larger share of the caching resources. Successful imple-
mentations of such designs require incentive mechanisms that induce truthful value
reporting. These incentives can be provided by economic means (i.e., pricing of the
cache resources). Reference [50] discusses the use of the generalized Vickrey auctions
[81], [80] for truthful revealiation of the user valuations. In Vickrey auction, the win-
ner of a single good auction pays the second highest bid. The bidder’s announcement
affects only when he wins, not how much he pays, and it can be shown that the bid-
der’s dominant strategy is to bid his true valuation. Unfortunately, such auction-based
strategies are not suitable for the large scale and highly dynamic structure of Internet.
Cache Consistency
For web caches to be useful, all caches should maintain an up-to-date copy of the
objects. That is, all cached copies of the objects should be consistent. There are
two types of consistency models: weak and strong [58]. In weak consistency a stale
(non-up-to-date) document may be returned to the user, while in strong consistency
no stale copy of the modified object is ever returned to the user after the server
updates all caches. Weak consistency protocols include adaptive TTL (time-to-live)
and client polling protocols. In the adaptive TTL approach a client considers a cached
copy up-to-date if its time-to-live has not expired. The difficulty in TTL approach
is in assigning TTL values to the objects. The adaptive TTL handles the problem
by taking advantage of the the fact that a file is unlikely to be changed if it has not
been modified for a long time. Thus, in adaptive TTL, the cache manager assigns a
time-to-live attribute to a document, and the TTL is a percentage of the document’s
current age. Studies have shown that the adaptive TTL protocol keeps the probability
of stale documents low (< 5%) and it is argued that the adaptive TTL is the best
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protocol for keeping weak consistency [37].
Strong consistency of the objects can be ensured by invalidation protocols. In this
approach, the web server keeps track of all clients that store an object from the web
server and when the object is updated, it sends invalidation messages to the clients.
This approach may increase the server loads considerably, since the server needs to
keep track of all clients with a copy of every object. However, hierarchical caching
along with multicasting may increase efficiency of keeping strong consistency [72]. In
[72] the authors compared pure push and automated pull strategies for varying degrees
of staleness that is accepted by the users. It is shown that if the users can accept some
staleness, automated pull with hierarchical caching is the optimal solution in terms
of bandwidth usage and server load. However, if the users always require the most
up-to-date documents, then the server gets overloaded by many pull requests. In that
case, push scheme seems a better solution. The push scheme can be implemented with
much less state information kept at the server and the proxies.
1.1.4 Implementation of Proxies
The users of a web site with multiple proxies need a mechanism to locate the nearby
proxy caches. The basic method for end users to locate these proxies is to hand config-
ure their browser with the proxies’ URL, or with the URL of an auto-configuration file.
However, this method is not scalable and is prone to errors. It would be much easier
to manage, if the user browser automatically learns the configuration information for
its web proxy settings. This problem is typically referred to as resource discovery
problem [31].
The servers may use DNS redirection to inform the users, or they may have a URL
page with a proxy auto-discovery script that a user may download to determine the
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locations of the proxies. WPAD [31] is a protocol that is developed for the users to
find this proxy auto-configuration file. WPAD protocol describes the methods that
are used in a particular order to determine the auto-discovery URL. WPAD does not
try to discover the name of the proxy server. The configuration file has other settings
that allows other functionalities such as load balancing, request routing to an array of
servers or automated fail-over to backup proxy server.
In order to completely avoid user reconfiguration, transparent redirection has been
developed. Transparent redirection involves the interception and redirection of HTTP
traffic to one or more web caches by a router or switch without requiring any coor-
dination from the client. The non-HTTP traffic, and the traffic for the requests that
cannot be satisfied locally are routed to the WAN.
WCCP [20] is a protocol that is developed for transparent caches to communicate
among themselves. WCCP has two main functions: first, it allows a router enabled for
transparent redirection to discover, verify and advertise connectivity to one or more
caches; second, it also allows one of the caches (so called designated cache) to dictate
how the router distributes redirected traffic across the cache farm.
Transparent proxy caching
A web cache is said to be transparent if the clients can access the cache without the
need to configure their browsers, for example, without any need of either a proxy
auto-configuration URL or a manual proxy setting. Transparent caches appear as a
seamless part of the network architecture rather than a set of discrete proxy servers.
The clients do not have to be aware of the existence of the proxies. Most ISPs prefer
transparent caches, since these caches do not require an action from the clients.
A transparent caching system acts as a router and forwards to the WAN every-
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thing but TCP traffic for HTTP requests (requests with TCP port number 80). A
transparent cache accepts all TCP connections routed to it. When a client sends a
TCP connection request for a web site to the router, the router forwards this request
to the transparent cache rather than to the WAN. The transparent cache sends ACK
to the client for this TCP request, and thus disguises itself as the original server.
However, this architecture is not scalable and is prone to system failures due to
cache outages. To provide scalable and fail-safe operation, transparent caches are
implemented together with L4 (layer 4) switches. These switches are called L4 switches
because they base their switching decisions on the information in the TCP header,
and TCP is a transport layer (layer 4) protocol in ISO OSI 7 layer reference model.
L4 switches are connected to multiple caches for scalability. An incoming request’s
destination address in the TCP header is seeded into a hash function, which determines
the cache that the request is going to be served by. The goal of a good L4 switch is
to partition the URLs into non-overlapping clusters, so that each caching proxy serves
certain number of distinct URLs. In the event of a cache failure, the switch forwards
all requests that are destined to the failed cache to the WAN router.
DNS redirection
The clients need the IP addresses of the proxies in order to open a connection and
retrieve the object. This information can be delivered to the clients during the initial
DNS look-up. The original server may forward a list of proxy IP addresses to the client
and the client may access one of these proxies in a round-robin fashion. However, with
this method the clients are still unaware of the status of the proxies, and may find
that the retrieval of the objects from their choice of proxy result in unsatisfactory
performance.
16
More intelligent method of DNS re-direction is performed by the CDNs. The
client looks up the IP address of the original server at the local DNS server. If the
information is not available in the local DNS server, the request is forwarded to the
authoritative name server of the original server. If the original server has subscribed
to the replication service, it returns the CDN’s central server’s IP address as the
authoritative DNS server to the local DNS server. The local DNS server then contacts
the CDN’s central server. The central server keeps statistics of performance of all of
its proxies and their links. Upon receiving a DNS request, the central server checks
the source IP address of the request to determine an optimal (in terms of physical
distance, link congestion and load balancing) proxy cache that should serve the web
request. The IP address of this proxy cache is returned as the DNS reply. Upon
discovering the IP address of the proxy cache, the user requests the object from the
proxy cache. The web page is downloaded from the local proxy server, if all parts of
the web page is available at the local server. If not, the local server pulls the web page
from the original web site on behalf of the user. Local server also decides dynamically
if the pulled document should be cached or not according to the user traffic logs.
Recently, Rodriguez et al. [71] suggested the parallel use of all proxies for a single
web page download to avoide the difficult problem of choosing the optimal proxy
cache. The authors considered two parallel access schemes. In the history-based TCP
access scheme, the client specifies a priori which part of the document should be
retrieved from each proxy. This decision is made according to the observed rate of the
servers that are calculated from the past accesses to the servers. In the dynamic TCP
access, the client partitions the document into small blocks, and initially requests each
block from different server. As a server finishes the delivery of a requested block, the
client requests a new block from this server. The authors showed that such a parallel
17
retrieval results in near optimal delivery of the popular documents. However, this
study assumed that the documents are large and they are identically replicated at all
proxies.
DNS Overview
The principle task of DNS is to provide a mapping from the human readable domain
names to the numerical IP-addresses used to identify the hosts in the Internet. DNS
is implemented as a distributed database consisting of a hierarchy of name servers.
The name space is divided into zones, where each zone has two or more authoritative
name servers. A name server is authoritative for a host if it always has a DNS record
that translates the host’s hostname to that host’s IP address. When a client needs
to obtain an IP-address for a hostname, the client first sends the query to its local
name server. Typically the local name server is close to the client, since each ISP
usually implements a local name server. The local name server acts as the primary
name server for the zone where the client resides, and has all the information about
that zone as well as cached copies of the queries for hosts from other zones. Assuming
that this name server does not have the requested information, it queries one of the
root name servers. Currently there are 13 root name servers in the world that return
the IP address of an authoritative name server that has the mapping for the requested
host name. Then the local name server contacts the authoritative name server, and
receives the IP address of the host, and finally this information is returned to the
client’s authoritative name server to be relayed to the client. [70], [54].
To avoid misdirection of DNS requests (that is, misdirection due to the client
mistakes in entering the address or change of the IP address of the DNS server) web
switches are used. The level 2 or 3 web switches determine which of the user messages
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are DNS requests, and redirect these requests to a local or remote DNS server based
on the ISP policy [92].
The initial DNS lookup may take several inquiry/reply transactions, and if the
authoritative DNS servers are far from each other, this may lead to considerable delay
for the users. Ref. [42] suggests to take advantage of recent advances in disk storage
and multicast distribution to avoid this delay. In this approach, the geographically
distributed and the so called replicated servers store the entire DNS database. To keep
the replicated servers up-to-date, the new resource records are distributed by satellite
broadcast or by terrestrial multicast. The replicated servers can be located at the local
ISPs and at corporate and university networks. The DNS look-up procedure in this
system is very similar to the original DNS look-up except that the local name servers
send DNS inquiry to the closest replicated server instead of the root name server. The
consistency of information among the replicated servers is preserved by the multicast
delivery of new information as it becomes available.
1.1.5 Providing Content in the Internet
The publishers in the Internet (content providers) have several options in how they
plan to reach the users. Publishers require a web site as a main source for information
dissemination. Publishers’ first option is to build their own web server. For this option,
the content providers require a web server (a PC or workstation), an Internet router
and a leased-line connection to an ISP. Furthermore, they have to pay for the Internet
access to the ISP and they need to hire staff for maintaining the web server.
For scalability and security purposes, content providers may prefer to own their own
web servers. However, instead of maintaining the servers at their location, they may
co-locate them at an ISP’s Network Operations Center (NOC). Consequently, content
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providers still own dedicated servers for their web sites, but share the same (possibly
high-speed) Internet connection with other content providers at the co-location host.
These co-location centers are equipped with necessary security, backup equipment and
staff to keep the servers in a good running condition. Publishers are charged for the
amount of physical space their servers take up in the co-location site, as well as for
the amount of user traffic served.
Many Internet publishers neither have the sufficient resources to build nor maintain
their own web server. Consequently, web content hosting has become an increasingly
common practice. Web content hosts own large amounts of resources (such as band-
width, disks, processors, memory, etc.) and they offer to store and provide Web access
to the documents from institutions, companies and individuals who lack resources.
Publishers, who subscribe to this service do not actually own a web server, but their
user traffic is directed to and served by the servers of the web content host. The stor-
age and the bandwidth capacity of the servers of the web content host is shared among
all web sites subscribing to the service. Usually, publishers vary in their expectations
and requirements for the quality of the hosting service and the amount of money each
is willing to pay. Thus, it is important to have the ability to offer different qualities of
service to different customers. Most web servers today do not provide differentiated
quality of service. Almeida et al. [1] investigated the priority-based request scheduling
for providing differentiated QoS in web content hosts. The paper however, came short
of investigating the optimal pricing schemes for different classes of users with varying
requirements for resources (such as bandwidth, disk space, processing power, etc).
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Content Distribution Networks
Due to the reasons discussed in the previous sections, ISPs and content providers may
choose to disseminate the content to the caches throughout the network. While doing
that they have several options: ISPs or content providers may install their own caches
or out-source caching services to providers such as Akamai[93], Mirror Image[94] or
DigitalIsland [95]. Not many content provider has the needs (due to large user traffic)
or the resources to build or maintain its own global replication network. The high user
traffic and alluring opportunities of global commerce over the Internet has thus lead
to the development of the CDNs. CDNs have multiple caches with large storage and
bandwidth capacities located in diverse geographical locations. For example, Mirror
Image has built Content Access Points (CAP) where the caches are located. They also
maintain a central server which continuously monitors the condition of the network
links, and the proxy servers [94].
The vital component of a content distribution architecture is a method for redirect-
ing clients to the proxy caches. The clients are usually redirected by a central server,
which keeps (quasi-) real-time information on the conditions of the caches. There are
two different redirection schemes currently employed by CDNs. Akamai [93] uses a
selective redirection scheme, where the original server delivers the base HTML page
to the client. The other objects in the HTML page such as large pictures are then
delivered by the proxy caches. Mirror Image [94] uses complete redirection, where all
objects including the base HTML page is delivered by an appropriate proxy cache.
The advantage (and also the disadvantage) of the selective redirection is that the ori-
gin servers keep control of their web pages and dictate the objects to be replicated.
They can also keep the history and statistics of user accesses, since the initial request
is always served by the original servers. However, [43] argues that the selective redi-
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rection is suboptimal compared to the complete redirection. The main reson for the
suboptimality is that the user has to set up two different TCP connections: one to
the original server for the base HTML, and the other to the closer proxy cache for the
remaining objects. The second TCP connection to the proxy again suffers from the
slow start and thus increasing the latency in the complete retrieval of the web page.
None of the CDNs favor hierarchical caches. This is due to the fact that the
hierarchical caching not only may result in the use some other network’s cache, but also
may result in non-optimal routing and may cause multiple round-trip delays between
the caches while searching for the cache containing the requested document. Thus,
whenever a document cannot be found in the proxy server, the proxy server directly
requests this page from the original server.
The E-business of Content Delivery
There is a strong demand from content providers for distributed network services
that go beyond best-effort services. Current structure of Internet value-chain and the
caching and replication technologies limit the content providers’ control over their
content especially with respect to performance and QoS. Current value chain is such
that consumer picks up the content from the respective site through subscription to
at least one ISP for reaching the Internet. In order to receive the content in a good
quality, the user has to make QoS negotiations with the intermediary ISPs. In [59] a
new value-chain is discussed, where the client subscribes to a content provider (e.g. e-
newspaper) and to an ISP for a special service called subscriber line management. This
service allows the content provider to control the QoS of the delivery of the content.
Thus, the QoS negotiations are transparent to the user, because the content provider
purchases communications services with appropriate QoS on behalf of the user. The
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user only pays to the content provider and the content provider is responsible for the
charges of the ISP.
The delivery of QoS guarantees in network bandwidth resources has been investi-
gated extensively. However, especially for guaranteed web content delivery, the storage
requirements should also be considered along with network bandwidth reservations.
In [18] and [19] the stor-serv architecture is discussed for data storage services that
can be considered as the dual of intserv and diffserv classes in the data transmission
domain. Ref. [18] describes the stor-serv framework which consists of service specifi-
cation and provision (resource reservation, resource mapping), resource management
and discovery, security and economics. The content provider may specify the perfor-
mance requirements in terms of access latency, jitter, acceptable miss rate, cost and
bandwidth savings. These guarantees may be given either as deterministic or statis-
tical. Obviously, statistical guarantees lead to better resource utilization [19]. The
resource allocation problem is solved as facilities-location problem [19]. Combining the
storage service allocation with network bandwith reservation for QoS may reduce the
total cost of service provision for the content providers.
In fact Kelly and Reeves [52] considered a simple two-stage hierarchical caching
model and solved the problem of determining the optimal cache sizes, when there
is a tradeoff between the storage and bandwidth costs. However the authors did not
consider the issue of QoS. In their model, the requests first arrive at the child caches. If
the request cannot be satisfied there, then the request is forwarded to the parent cache.
However, the bandwidth over the link connecting the parent cache and the child cache
is not free. Thus each missed request incurs a cost for the content provider. Meanwhile,
the storage space on the caches is not free either. The unit bandwidth and the cache
prices are fixed and given as dollars per byte. Ref. [52] determines which documents
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should be cached at which level of the hierarchy so that the overall cost to the content
provider is minimized.
1.2 Current Pricing Structure in the Internet
Typical money flow in the Internet is from the end-users to the ISPs. The end-users
pay their local ISP for their Internet service, who in turn pays for the interconnection
to a regional ISP, who in turn pays for the interconnection to the national ISP. The
national ISP has to pay costs of connecting the system to a data exchange location to
communicate with other national ISPs. The cost structure of the services provided in
any layer is determined by the prices charged by the providers one layer below and by
the providers one layer above.
ISPs charge their customers according to two types of costs that they have incurred:
access and usage costs. One type of access cost incurred by the ISPs is the installation
cost. This cost refers to the set up of the ISP network including the investments in the
network infrastructure. Another type of access cost is the customer activation costs,
which refer to the costs associated with the connection of the customers to the ISP
via modems, wiring, ISP’s server disk space, IP address fee, etc [82].
ISP usage costs vary with customer. There are two types of usage costs: main-
tenance and network load costs. Currently, due to the flat interconnection fees the
network load cost to ISPs is zero regardless of network congestion. However, the
clients observe the network load cost as the delay when the network is congested. It is
apparent that no two users have the same expectations from an Internet connection.
Some users may download larger files, while some users may run applications requiring
real-time information delivery. The users with real-time communications usually cre-
ate more traffic and should be charged accordingly. Under a flat-fee scheme, low-usage
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customers are subsidizing the heavy-usage customers by paying the same fee.
Eventually the ISPs expand their capacity to ease the congestion experienced by
their customers. It is appropriate to expand capacity, if the marginal cost (cost of
accomodating one more packet) is less than the marginal benefit (the price charged
for the packet). The objective of the ISP is to cover this expansion cost through the
customer usage fees.
1.2.1 Congestion Pricing
The congestion of the Internet causes wide range of dissatisfaction among the users.
As discussed above, the network load has no cost for the ISPs, however; since the ISPs
attract customers by the quality of their service, their market share is directly affected
by their customers’ satisfaction. Thus, the service providers may be inclined toward
more sophisticated pricing schemes that can alleviate the network congestion.
Proper resource allocation plays a key role in improving the network performance.
The centralized approach to resource allocation seems futile considering the large scale
of the Internet, and the large variability of individual user’s valuation of their con-
nections. The pricing approach to resource allocation allows users to self-select the
quantity that they are willing to purchase at the effective prices.
The current method of charging a flat-fee allows users to demand as much usage
as they desire without any regard to the other users’ connections. When everyone acts
greedy, congestion may occur depending on the network capacity. Usage based pricing
schemes are proposed to alleviate the network congestion. The social objective of a
network is to maximize the total user satisfication. However, the current Internet com-
munity is very diverse, and many users will follow a non-cooperative self-maximizing
behaviour. In that case, every user will try to maximize its own satisfaction by com-
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peting with others for the limited resources. This problem can be described as a
non-cooperative game, which has a Pareto optimum solution. In a pareto optimal
solution, the exchange of the goods between the suppliers and the demanders is max-
imized by pricing the goods at their marginal cost. In other words, on the supply
side prices should compensate suppliers (ISPs) of scarce Internet resources. On the
demand side, prices should allocate resources efficiently by considering the value each
user places on the Internet connection. However, also note that if there were no con-
gestion, flat-fee pricing would optimally allocate current resources, since with the lines
and routers already in place, there is negligible marginal private cost of operation [38].
The basic idea in pricing of network traffic is to charge the incremental cost of
transporting the traffic over the network links. From the network’s perspective, the
incremental cost of transport of traffic through network is negligible. Thus, the in-
cremental cost only depends on the externality cost. An externality is an effect of
a participant on another that takes place outside the market [63]. In computer net-
works, the externalities include both congestion effects, where one user’s use imposes a
performance penalty on other users (congestion), and also connectivity effects, where
a user benefits from other users being connected to the network (multicast). Current
research has focused on externality or congestion pricing. Under this framework, a job
is priced according to what impact it has on the QoS of other jobs.
An optimal congestion pricing scheme should depend on the current network load,
the rate of transfer requested and the traffic volume of the session (amount of traffic
generated during the session).
There have been several proposals for usage-based pricing schemes. Ref. [21] is one
of the first papers that discusses the pricing issues in the computer networks. Ref.
[21] discusses a simple two-priority service discipline and several different applications
26
running over the standard transport layer protocols. Thus, there is no specific QoS
guarantee given to the users. The server basically keeps two FIFO queues for two
service classes. Then, by simulation the authors compared the flat pricing with priority
pricing, where a higher per-byte price is charged for the high priority traffic. The
user satisfaction is measured in terms of the cost and the received QoS. The results
suggest that every application type is better off with priority pricing, and the users
when maximizing their utilities, also choose service levels that maximize the network
efficiency. However, for the efficient use of resources, the charges for different priority
classes should be updated as the load on the system changes. However, in the Internet
the demand fluctuates frequently and it is not clear how the charges should be changed
according to these fluctuations under this model.
Gupta et al. suggested a model that combines priority pricing schemes with the
current fixed connection fee [35], [36]. The users specify a priority class when requesting
a connection. The network services the requests of the higher priority classes first. A
user pays a congestion toll and suffers a delay cost when accessing the network. The
congestion toll depends on the marginal cost of the delay the user causes on other
users. Each user tries to minimize the total of congestion toll and the expected delay
cost. If the user valuation for the connection exceeds these costs, then it connects to
the network, otherwise it waits for a less congested time to re-connect. This method
distributes the load over time, and maximizes the social benefit. However, this proposal
cannot also take into account the instantaneous fluctuations in the network state and
thus cannot give optimal results for all users.
MacKie-Mason and Varian [64] proposed a “smart market” where each packet
carries a bid in the packet header. The packets are given service at each router if
their bids exceed some threshold, and each served packet is charged this threshold
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price regardless of their bids. This threshold is chosen to be equal to the market
clearing price. At market clearing price total demand equals to the supply. This
is the point where the network resources are fully utilized. The main advantage of
this proposal is that the users always bid their true valuation, since this only affects
whether they get the service or not, but not how much they pay [80]. However, apart
from the complexity, the proposal has the additional flaw of not achieving the true
optimality. When the packet is denied of service at a route at a specific time, the
packet is not lost. It is only delayed. This delay is unknown either to the user or to
the network. However, users value their packets according to the delay they encounter,
and thus for true bidding they need to know this delay in advance. Furthermore, the
abovementioned procedure is repeated at every router, however; the true valuation
for the user considers only end-to-end delay that a packet encounters. Extending the
“smart market” framework for end-to-end connections is computationally prohibitive.
Ref. [65] describes another method of decentralized congestion pricing of a limited
network resource with the objective of maximizing the efficiency of the network. The
network efficiency is defined as the total user benefit less the cost of the network.
The method internalizes the congestion by defining shadow price which is the total
marginal congestion cost an increase in one of the user’s share of the resource imposes
on other users. However unlike Gupta et al., the authors assumed that the user utility
functions are available to the network. MacKie-Mason et al. has also investigated
the pricing schemes in a competitive environment. The authors assumed that the
network implements two-part tariff for pricing: a fixed subscription/attachment fee,
and a usage fee that depends on the total load generated by the user. They consider
only linear pricing, where the network charges p dollars per byte user forwards. In
their model both users and the providers try to optimize their benefit. Users choose
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which provider to use and how much to use, while the provider chooses its capacity
and how much bandwidth to supply to users. It is shown that a competitive supplier
is forced to charge the socially optimal price for the quality of service that he offers.
It is shown that at equilibrium the congestion in a system with no usage fee is higher
than the one with usage pricing.
Pricing of the network resources (especially the bandwidth) has also been consid-
ered for improving the rate control algorithms used in the Internet (TCP) and the
ATM networks. Kelly [47] introduced the notion of proportional fairness, which is ba-
sically equivalent to distributing the network resources to the users according to their
valuations for these resources. The objective is to maximize the total social welfare of
the users accessing the network with limited capacity. It is shown that this problem
can be decentralized by individual user and network optimization problems that are
solved independently. The coupling between the two optimization problems is the unit
prices of the resources that the network advertises to their users. The unit prices of
the resources are determined as the optimal solutions to the network revenue maxi-
mization problem under the current user demands. According to these prices users
re-calculate the optimal demand that maximizes their net benefit. It is shown that
there exists equilibrium resource prices and user demands that lead to the optimal
solutions for the social welfare problem.
In [32] authors describe a method that can provide the end-users the necessary
incentives to improve the network efficiency by marking appropriate packets at over-
loaded resources and by charging a fixed small amount for each mark received. This
pricing method provides an alternative to the Differentiated Services architecture de-
signed by IETF. Informing the end-users of the current state of the network by marked
packets allows the end-users to design their own strategies in view of their personal
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needs. Thus, the users do not have to choose among a number of fixed QoS classes.
The user does not have to dynamically decide for their strategies as the network state
changes. The decision of when and how much data to send can be made transparent
to the user by implementing intelligent agents. Ref. [23] describes such an intelligent
agent for Available Bit Rate (ABR) type connections in ATM networks. This work
builds on the theory presented in [32]. Each user i declares his willingness to pay wi,
and is allocated a portion xi of the available capacity. This portion is proportional to
wi ie xi = wi∑
j
wj
C. Demand for bandwidth varies in time and the available capacity to
ABR also changes due to VBR and CBR connections. Thus, offering the same amount
of money does not lead to the optimal utility for money under different conditions.
The intelligent agent (IA) determines the best willingness to pay function for varying
conditions. The IA prior to the activation learns the user behavior by keeping record of
the price that user pays for some bandwidth. Assuming that initially the user has the
optimal amount of bandwidth with optimal willingness to pay (w0, x0), the network
state has changed. In that case the user allocation for the same willingness to pay has
changed to x1. IA estimates the new price of the bandwidth by p1 = w0x1 , and from the
aforementioned price versus bandwidth function it determines the optimal willingness
to pay. IA continually updates its willingness to pay, until an equilibrium is reached.
Instead of implementing intelligent agents at each user, the network itself can
implement a network broker for the same purpose [29]. Fulp et al. proposes a network
model at which the network links form individual competitive markets, where the
link prices are updated according to the user demand by tatonnement process. In
a tatonnement process the new price is equal to the previous price plus a correction
function. The correction function increases the price when the total bandwidth used
is beyond a threshold. If the total bandwidth in use is lower than this threshold the
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price is decreased. The network broker calculates the amount of bandwidth that a user
should request according to the effect that this bandwidth will have on the prices. If the
user can afford the bandwidth under these new prices then the user starts transmitting
at this rate. One simplifying assumption this study has made is that the portion of
the user budget for each link in the route is given and fixed. However, dynamically
proportioning of the user budget among the links should give better results.
1.2.2 Simplifying Congestion Pricing
Ref. [76] brings a new perspective to the optimal dynamic pricing schemes discussed
so far. In this article, the authors argue that optimal congestion pricing may not be
able to provide the necessary funds to cover the network costs, and in fact optimal
congestion pricing may not be at all implemented due to its high complexity. For
this reason, authors suggest approximate methods which may be suboptimal but can
provide the sufficient network efficiency by simple to implement algorithms. First, the
authors suggest to replace the cost of the actual path with the cost of the expected
path, where the charge depends only on the source and destination of the flow and not
on the particular route taken by the flow. This would help reduce the overwhelming
communications among routers for each flow. Second, the authors suggest to approxi-
mate the current congestion conditions by the expected congestion conditions. This is
essentially QoS-sensitive time-of-day pricing. Previous studies argued that time-of-day
pricing has the problem that it does not reflect any instantenous fluctuations in traffic
levels [67]. For example, packets that are sent during an idle network condition will
be charged the full price as if there was congestion. However, as the authors argue
users may overcome this problem by adjusting their service quality to the network
condition. During low utilization, users may access the network via lower service class
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but receive sufficient QoS and thus pay less.
Tsitsiklis and Paschalidis [79] discusses in detail the abovementioned issue of deter-
mining the right time scale over which prices should evolve. The authors investigated
a problem, where there are multiple classes of users each of which demanding certain
amount of network resources. The user requests arrive according to a stationary Pois-
son process. The users pay a fee depending on their class upon the acceptance of the
request. The user arrival rates decrease as the fee increases. The objective of the net-
work provider is to maximize either the revenue or the social welfare by determining a
tariff as a function of available network capacity. It is shown that this problem can be
solved as a dynamic programming problem. The authors also investigated the static
(or time-of-day) pricing policies. The static pricing policies are of interest because they
are simple to implement and provide users a predictable, fixed pricing structure. They
have shown that when there are many users each with infinitesimal resource demand
compared to the total capacity, the static pricing policy can achieve the optimum that
the dynamic pricing policy achieves.
By approximating prices according to time and route, the resulting prices can be
determined and charges assessed at the local access points. This local scheme is called
edge pricing in [76]. Edge pricing schemes are very appealing, because they allow
service providers offer many competitive and complex pricing schemes to the user




The initial model for the World Wide Web was based on clients interacting with origin
servers to request and receive content or services. As the Web increased in scale, this
model proved unwiedly for several reasons and resulted in current industry efforts to
build and operate CDNs. The purpose of these CDNs is to create a scalable service
that can meet aggregate client demand while improving the performance and quality
of delivery.
Content Networks typically aim to solve the “content distribution” problem, where
the goal is to determine the best location between the original source and client for the
content to be delivered. The best location of content usually depends on the network
proximity and the load of the servers.
In the following, we first give a general formulation of the content distribution
problem. Then, we describe the CDN architecture as will be considered in the rest
of the thesis. According to this architecture, we develop a tractable version of the
content distribution problem, and identify the important issues in this context.
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2.1 Content Distribution Problem
Consider a network N = G(V,E), where V is the set of vertices (nodes) and E is
the set of edges (links) connecting the vertices. The vertices house the caching and
processing resources, while the edges are the links between the network nodes, which
have some fixed capacity bandwidth and buffer resources. There are M information
servers that can be located at any of the vertices. Server m is the origin of information
objects Mm = {µ1m, µ2m, . . .}. The objects of each server are replicated to other nodes
in the network. Let V = {OV1 , OV2 , . . . , OV|V |} denote the sets of objects stored at each
node (a replication strategy). Let OVv = {ov1, ov2, . . .} denote the set of objects stored
in the node v under the replication strategy V. Let sov
k
be the size of the object ovk
stored at node v. Then
∑
k∈OVv sk ≤ Cv, where Cv is the size of the cache at node v.
There are K users requesting objects from the servers. Assume that user i requests
object ji and it is delivered from node vi. Let Pi,vi be the set of paths between the
node user i resides and the node vi. A path pi ∈ Pi,vi is selected for the delivery of
the object. The path pi defines an ordered set of links l from node where user i resides
to the node vi, i.e. pi = {l1pi , l2pi , . . . , l
L(pi)
pi }, where L(pi) is the length of path pi. Let
rli be the bandwidth resource allocated to user i’s request over the link l ∈ pi. Define
Ri(pi) = {rli, l ∈ pi}. A resource allocation is feasible, if at no link the total resources
required by the connection is more than those available. Assume that total bandwith
resource available on link l is Bl.
User i receives a utility ui(ji, vi, pi, Ri(pi)) from object ji, when it receives the
object from node vi over the path pi where Ri(pi) bandwidth resources are allocated
over the links of the path. The social objective of any network is to maximize the
total user utility. The content distribution problem can be described as a joint object
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replication and resource allocation problem. Let η(l,p) = {i : l ∈ pi, i = 1, 2, . . . K}
be the set of users with their paths containing link l. Then the joint optimization











rli ≤ Bl, ∀l ∈ E
∑
o∈OVv
so ≤ Cv, ∀v ∈ V
This is a combinatorial optimization problem with many state variables. It has
been shown in the literature that simpler versions of this problem are NP-hard. We
propose to develop distributed methods for finding a near-optimal solution to this
problem. We resort to microeconomic methods for finding the distributed solutions.
Two basic microeconomic approaches have been discussed in the literature for finding
efficient distributed resource allocation schemes in the networks: resource-directed
and price-directed [40]. In the resource-directed approach, each user calculates the
marginal values for its current resources and communicates it to the other users. The
allocation is then changed, so that the users with above average marginal utility receive
larger portion of the resource. On the other hand, the price-directed approach sets
an initial set of prices for the resources, which is then announced to the users. The
users determine their resource allocation requests according to these prices. Prices are
then iteratively changed to accomodate the demands for the resources, until the total
demand equals to the total resource available.
In this work we are going to use the price-directed approach, since it more closely
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models the real systems.
2.2 Content Delivery Network Architecture
We can conceptualize content networks as the interconnection of network elements at
the application layer of the OSI model. Whereas lower-layer network infrastructures
revolves around the routing, forwarding and switching of frames and packets, content
networks deal with the routing and forwarding of requests and responses for content.
The units of transported data in content networks are often very large and span
hundreds or thousands of packets.
Currently there is a considerable effort in developing an architecture to peer content
networks to improve the Internet performance [25], [34], [68], [2], [6] and [14]. In this
effort, the trend is moving from the speculative caching (proxy servers) to the service
level agreements (SLAs) between the publishers and the surrogates. The publisher is
the party that ultimately controls the content and its distribution. A surrogate is a
delivery server, other than the origin server. An origin server is the point at which
the content first enters the Internet. The origin server for any object is the server or
a set of servers that holds the authoritative copy for that object. The user requests
are routed to the surrogates, which deliver the corresponding content. Publishers have
more control over their content by using the surrogates. The desired level of quality of
service can be defined with respect to variety of different parameters such as average
delay experienced by the users and the web site’s server load or the amount of space
allocated to a web site on the surrogates and the extend of geographical distribution
of content, etc.
In the on-going work, [2], [34], [68] with respect to the peering of the CDNs, a
simple architecture has been developed. In this architecture a content network is
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modeled as composed of three seperate sub-systems:
1. Distribution System coordinates the activity of moving publisher’s (content provider’s)
content to one or more of the surrogates. Content dissemination can be publisher-
initiated (“push” of the documents according to anticipated user load) or CDN-
initiated (“pull” of the documents after receiving a client request) or both.
2. Request-Routing System (RRS) coordinates the activity of directing a client re-
quest to a suitable surrogate. RRS may direct the request to one of the surro-
gates of the CDN, to a peered CDN or the original server itself. The selection of
the most suitable server depends on the load, availability and user preference-
location, delay, etc. of the surrogate cache. As discussed in detail in the later
sections, we argue that these factors can be incorporated in a shadow price an-
nounced by the surrogate.
3. Accounting System determines the methods for measurement and pricing of the
distribution and delivery activities. Usually the CDN may charge for two re-
sources: storage and bandwidth. Storage charges may correspond to the activity
of distribution the publishers’ content. Meanwhile the bandwith cost relates to
the user requests that are serviced by the CDN.
Figure 2.1 illustrates the CDN architecture that we will consider in this thesis.
Operation of the system can be summarized as follows:
1. Publisher selects a desired QoS and negotiates a Service Level Agreement (SLA)
with the CDN. The selected level of QoS depends on the benefit received by the
publisher/clients and the cost of service with that level of QoS. The dissemination
of the content to the surrogates takes place according to the anticipated user
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Figure 2.1: CDN Architecture
statics as well as other off-line market research. Either publisher or the CDN
determines which content has to be disseminated to where according to the user
statistics, the desired QoS (in terms of average user latency, server load, etc.),
the locations of the surrogates and the CDNs’ pricing methods.
2. Distribution sub-system coordinates the dissemination of the content to the sur-
rogates in lieu of a SLA, which is agreed upon by the publisher and CDN.
The distribution decision requires the information about the publisher utility
functions, user access statistics and the geographical locations and storage and
transmission resource capacities of the surrogates.
3. Client requests are directed to a unique network element responsible of request
routing. The RRS can be implemented in several forms:
(a) DNS re-routing: The client is informed about a suitable surrogate by DNS
resolution. Client IP address and full URI are not inspected to determine
38
a suitable surrogate.
(b) Application-level routing: full URI as well as the client IP address are
inspected to determine the most suitable surrogate at the cost of increased
processing delay.
(c) The request routing function may be implied by an in-path network element
such as caching proxy, which is typical for a Access Content Network. In
this case, the request routing is optimized to a null function, since the
client is a priori mapped to a surrogate. If the object is locally stored, the
request is immediately served, otherwise the request is forwarded toward
the original server. There may be several in-path elements (hierarchical
caching) performing the same operations.
An important issue for DNS and application-level routing is their substantial
information needs for correct functioning. These methods require the up-to-date
content and availability (network and server) knowledge from all the surrogates
as well as the peered CDNs.
4. Distribution sub-system may re-examine the content of the surrogates according
to the current request arrival distribution. Either surrogates may request the
objects upon cache-miss similar to the way current proxy caches do, or these
statistics can be used by the publishers or the distribution system (as an agent
for publisher) to periodically re-arrange the content to satisfy the desired SLAs.
5. Request-routing system may forward the client request to a peer CDN in case
the requested object cannot be found in its own surrogates and/or it is more
efficient to do so. Peered CDNs appear as black-boxes to each other and can
only gather information about their distribution and request routing sub-systems
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according to the content and network advertisement that they send out period-
ically. In these advertisements CDNs announce the network state (including
geographical locations, capacity, load and the content stored in their surrogates)
and the summary of the available content of each surrogate. Real-time update of
these advertisements can be difficult due to the difficulty to dynamically measure
network-state and the size of the content information in the surrogates. However
several methods can provide approximate behavior, e.g. bloom-filters [26], delta
updates [73], periodical polling [28], etc.
6. The records for caching and transmission costs are kept for accounting purposes.
CDN charges the publishers for the amount of content stored in their network.
This charge may depend on the SLA. The storage charge may refer to the shadow
price for the limited storage space available in the surrogates. Furthermore, the
CDN may charge for the individual requests served by the network. This charge
can be validated by the limited processing capacity of the surrogates.
2.3 Content Delivery Problem
We have seen that the content distribution problem is a combinatorial optimization
problem, which is very difficult to solve optimally. In this section, we consider a
simplified version of this problem that also fits more closely to the current content
network architecture.
We consider a business model in which the primary customers of the CDNs are the
web servers (publishers). Notice that the benefit of each publisher can be given as the
total utility of the individual users accessing the publisher. According to the notation
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ui(ji, vi, pi, Ri(pi)), (2.2)
where v= {vi}Ki=1, p= {pi}Ki=1 and R(p)= {Ri(pi)}Ki=1 are the vectors of cache loca-
tions, paths and resources allocated on these paths used for the delivery of the users’
requested objects respectively.
The system objective is to maximize the total benefit of the publishers subject to
the limited caching and bandwidth resources. The joint system optimization problem











rli ≤ Bl, ∀l ∈ E
∑
o∈OVv
so ≤ Cv, ∀v ∈ V.
In this work, we consider the optimization of abovementioned system optimization
problem as well as the optimization of the multi-criteria problem formed by the max-
imization of the individual publisher net benefits. Notice that in the Internet agents
(users, publisher, caches, etc) are selfish and non-cooperative and try to maximize
their own benefit regardless of other publishers. We will investigate the effects of such
behaviors as compared to the system solution.
We consider the average performance of the system. The system objective is to
maximize average aggregate publisher utilities. We assume that URL routing is used
to direct user requests to the appropriate surrogates. However, only the original server
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identifier is used in the routing decision and not the complete object identifier. We
believe this type of operation is more efficient due to the high processing and messag-
ing costs affiliated with the complete HTTP header routing. Notice that for complete
HTTP header routing, the complete and up-to-date cache content information is re-
quired. Although schemes such as delta update and summary cache [26] are suggested,
they are not very practical and easily implementable. Thus, when a user request is di-
rected to a surrogate, there is a probability that the requested object is not found in the
cache. In that case, the request is re-routed to the original server. We do not consider
hierarchical/cooperative caching in this architecture, since hierarchical/cooperative
caches result in increased processing and messaging overhead.
Users are clustered in LANs. They connect to the publisher web sites via their ISPs
and the WANs. Assume that a user from network n is interested in an object provided
by the publisher m. Also assume that the user request is routed to the surrogate s.
The probability of the user request served at this surrogate depends on the content
dissemination strategy of the publisher m, which can be in effect summarized by the
cache hit probability Prmhit. The total retrieval delay is the sum of the propagation
and transmission delays. The average propagation delay that the user expects is
ds,propn,m = dpropn,s + (1 − Prmhit)dprops,m , where dpropk,l denotes the propagation delay between
the nodes k and l. The average transmission delay depends on the current load of the
servers and is given by ds,trann,m = Prmhitd
tran
s + (1 − Prmhit)dtranm , where the transmission
delay corresponding to the current load at node k is assumed to be known as dtrank .
We assume that all objects are the same size. The network distance, i.e. the delay
between two nodes, can easily be determined by methods such as periodic probing







A reasonable user utility function decreases with increasing latency ds,totaln,m . Thus, the
primary objective of the content delivery problem can be summarized as the mini-
mization of a function of the average user latency.
For our purposes we only consider the bandwidth and caching resources in the
CDN. We assume for fairness reasons that every user request is assigned the same
amount of bandwidth. Thus, each cache can serve a fixed number of user requests at
a time. The requested objects are delivered to the users from the selected cache over
the shortest path in order to maximize the user utilities.
According to the definition of content delivery problem as given in eq. (2.3), we
may divide the content delivery problem into two: distribution and request routing
sub-problems. The distribution sub-problem solves the optimization problem (2.3) for
the optimal distribution of objects given the rate of user requests arriving to each
cache. The routing sub-problem solves (2.3) for optimal user request arrival rates to
each cache given the object dissemination strategy. Although these two sub-problems
are jointly related, for the purpose of designing a practical algorithm we envision
an iterative scheme in which each sub-problem is solved separately. In this scheme,
the distribution sub-problem determines the dissemination strategy according to the
arrival rates as determined by the request-routing sub-problem. The request routing
sub-problem determines the routing strategy according to cache content as determined
by the distribution sub-problem. These sub-problems update their decisions iteratively
according to the output of the other. We expect that if the solutions to these two sub-
problems are (near-) optimal, then the solution to the overall content delivery problem
is also (near-) optimal.
In order to allocate limited resources as efficiently as possible, we implement price-
directed market-based algorithms. Thus, each surrogate charges a price for the amount
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of resources allocated to the publishers. In the following, we define the distribution
and routing sub-problems with the understanding that each publisher and surrogate
maximizes its own benefit regardless of the system optimization problem. Notice
that the benefit of a publisher is the total utility of its users with the given resource
allocations less the cost of these resource allocations. Meanwhile, the benefit of a
surrogate is the total revenue received by selling/renting the available resources. In
the later sections of the thesis, we show that the competitive behavior leads to solutions
that are close to the system optimum solution.
2.3.1 Distribution sub-problem
Let λnm,s be the request arrival rate observed at surrogate s for the objects in the










m,s, be the arrival rate to surrogate s for the objects in the publisher
m. For the purposes of the distribution sub-problem, we assume that λnm,s is known.
The objective is to disseminate the publisher’s content to the surrogates so that the
net publisher utility is maximized. In the previous section, we mentioned that the
content dissemination strategy of the publisher can be summarized by the cache hit
probability. Assume that xm,s amount of caching space is allocated for the objects of
the publisher m in the surrogate s. In order to maximize the cache hit probability
the publisher disseminates the most popular objects to the surrogate. Let Prmhit(xm,s)
denote the cache hit probability observed when xm,s caching space allocated to the
publisher.
Further assume that users have an identical utility function, u(v, pn,v, r), where v
is the surrogate delivering the object, pn,v is the shortest path between the surrogate
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and the user network and r is the fixed resource allocated for any user request. Thus,
the utility function for publisher m depends only on the sizes of the cache allocations
in each surrogate, xm,s and the user request arrival rates to each surrogate, λnm,s, i.e.






hitu(s, pn,s, r) + λ
n
m,s(1 − Prmhit)u(m, pm,s, r)
]
. (2.5)
In the distribution sub-problem, the only cost arises from the cost of usage of
caching resources. Let pcaches denote the price charged by surrogate s for the unit cache
space. We assume that there is no collaboration among the publishers or publishers.
Each publisher and surrogate tries to maximize its own net benefit regardless of others.


















xm,s ≤ Ccaches ,
where Ccaches is the total caching capacity of the surrogate.
This type of system is called a game. The publishers and surrogates are playing a
game in which each try to maximize its benefit by selecting an appropriate strategy.
However, the final benefit received depends on the strategies of other publishers and
surrogates. We analyze this system in Chapter 3. We determine the optimal strategies
of the publishers and the surrogates. We also show that this game has an equilibrium
strategy, where no player can change its strategy without reducing its benefit.
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2.3.2 Request-Routing Sub-problem
The objective of the request-routing sub-problem is to direct a user request to an
appropriate surrogate. We may conceptualize the RRS operation as depicted in Fig-
ure 2.2. The requests from the users are first intercepted by the RRS. The RRS is
basically a DNS server performing URL routing. The RRS checks the HTTP header
to determine the user network and the requested URL. The RRS also keeps real-time
information on the network distances between the user networks and the surrogates.
The RRS has the knowledge of which surrogates contain (at least with high probabil-
ity) the objects requested by the clients. Thus, for each object requested by the clients
we may have different set of surrogates S0, S1, . . . , SK . The RRS may route the user
request directly to the origin server, S0, if it is optimal to do so. Surrogates charge
ptrans for each user request served. This price can be interpreted as the shadow price











s ps λm,s is the cost of serving λm,s user requests at the surrogate s.









λm,s ≤ Ctrans ,
where Ccaches is the total caching capacity of the surrogate.
In Chapter 4, we determine the solution to the abovementioned game. The routing
game formed by above two optimization problems is shown to have an equilibrium as




















Figure 2.2: Request-routing sub-system
an equilibrium, and the equilibrium solutions are continuous, we establish that there
exists an equilibrium to the overall problem.
In Chapter 4, we also consider a different objective for the RRS. In many cases,
instead of requesting separate resource allocations from each surrogate, the publishers
may request from the CDN an average delay bound for their users’ requests to be
satisfied. In such a case, the objective of the RRS is to satisfy this delay bound
at the minimum total cost to the publishers. Such an objective makes sense in the
competitive business model of the Internet. In this model, the CDN optimization
























λnm,s ≤ Ctrans , ∀s,
where Ctrans is the total transmission capacity of the surrogate. In Chapter 4, we
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determine the solution to this problem. We also show that the optimization problem
in (RRS) usually does not have an equilibrium, when the publishers update their
requested delay bounds according to the CDN prices.
2.3.3 Provision of diff-serv-like QoS in CDNs by Nonlinear Pricing
The distribution and request-routing sub-problems together establish a system, where
the publishers can adjust their QoS with infinite precision. We also explore the case,
where the CDN provides only limited number of options for QoS. In Chapter 5, we
explore the optimal pricing rules when the available resource is shared among the
users. The resource provider partitions its resource and charges a different price in
each partition. The users subscribe to a partition, and share the resource available in
the partition with those who also subscribed to the same partition. The user’s decision
to subscribe to a partition depends on the net benefit it receives. A similar type of
system was investigated by Odlyzko in [69]. Unlike [69], we investigate the optimal
nonlinear pricing scheme, when the user utility functions can be estimated. We further
investigate the optimal condition for partitioning the resources. We determine that
the optimality of resource partition depends on the user arrival rate, the capacity of




In this chapter, we consider a realistic model for the relationship between the pub-
lishers and the content delivery networks. The publishers disseminate a part of their
content to the surrogates to improve the user latency. Meanwhile, surrogates charge
the publishers for the amount of caching space the publisher’s content allocate. How-
ever, there are multiple surrogates competing to serve the publishers. We investigate
the effect of this competition on the system. Specifically, we show that such a price
competition leads to an equilibrium, which under certain conditions, leads to the opti-
mal cache allocation strategy for the publishers. This approach provides a dynamical
and distributed algorithm for determining the cache content in the network, which has
a performance close to the optimum solution.
3.1 System Model
Figure 3.1 illustrates the network set-up that we are interested in this chapter. There
are several LANs where the users reside. Every user is interested in one or more of the
objects of a publisher. If the publishers have subscribed to a CDN, the user requests are
first intercepted by the request-routing sub-system of the CDN. The request-routing
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surrogate and

































Figure 3.1: Content delivery system
subsystem then forwards the user request to an appropriate surrogate, perhaps the one
with the highest probability of delivering the requested object with minimum latency.
For the distribution sub-problem, we assume the routing decision is made and the user
request arrival rates to each surrogate is fixed. The surrogates are located between the
user networks and the origin servers. Thus, users are always at most two hops away
from the content. A user request is first checked at the corresponding surrogate. If
the requested object is available at the surrogate, the request is immediately served.
Otherwise, the request is forwarded to the origin server, where the object originally
resides.
The surrogates have limited cache size, and the cache is shared among the pub-
lishers. The surrogates charge the publishers for the portion of the cache their content
occupies. We assume that the surrogates of a CDN does not cooperate, probably
due to high messaging and processing overheads associated with cooperative caching.
Instead, they act non-cooperatively with the objective of maximizing their individual
revenues. The surrogates compete among each other to store the publishers content.
The publishers do not collaborate either, and try to purchase as much cache space as









Figure 3.2: Bail-out rates for various download times [89]
Assume that there are I different publishers (origin servers) and J different sur-
rogates present in the network. The user requests arrive from N different user LANs.
Let λj,ni denote the total request arrival rate from LAN n at surrogate j for the con-




i be the total arrival rate to the surrogate
j for the content in publisher i. The user interest in the objects of the publishers
is distributed according to Zipf distribution [88]. That is, given that a request has
arrived, the probability that the request is for object h is q(h) = chαi , where c is the
normalization constant, and 0 < αi < 1 is the distribution characteristic of publisher
i. The characterization of user request distribution as a Zipf distribution is discussed
in previous studies [13], [51] and is widely accepted as a good approximation to the
actual web traffic behavior.
Recent studies [89] have shown that as the latency increases, users stop browsing
the requested page (bail-out) with increasing probability (Figure 3.2). Since the Inter-
net became more and more commercially oriented, the bail-out rate started to have a
direct economic impact for the web sites. It is of interest for web sites to have a fast
object delivery rate in order not to lose customers. The web sites (publishers) can
be considered as content providers. They make their revenue either by selling some
information content (such as news, maps, etc.) or by selling tangible products. The
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necessary (but not sufficient) condition to keep the users browsing the web site is the
timely delivery of the content. However, one can easily see from Figure 3.2 that the
user bail-out rate have nonlinear relationship with the retrieval time. Thus, from the
content providers’ view the important metric is the minimization of the lost revenue
rather than the retrieval time. In this chapter, we consider a more generalized version
of the content delivery problem, where every publisher i receives varying benefit from
provision of a user request with a certain delay, which is reflected in the selection of
benefit function wi(d). We assume that wi(d) is concave.
We can identify two types of optimization problems in this model: publisher’s
revenue maximization and the surrogates revenue maximization. We first determine
the publisher’s optimal caching strategy under a certain surrogate pricing scheme.
3.2 Optimal Publisher Strategy





be the total investment of the ith publisher. It is assumed that the information stored
in the publishers is continuous and can be replicated continuously to a surrogate.
The total information available at the publisher i is χi. The publisher replicates its
most popular part of the content to the surrogates so that the cache hit probability is
maximized. Assuming that Ci units of cache space is allocated to the publisher, the
















Note that we assumed that q(0) = 0 in arriving this result.
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Let pj denote the price of the unit cache space in surrogate j. Let the pricing policy,
p = (p1, p2, . . . , pJ), denote the set of unit cache space prices of all the surrogates in
the network. Let dij denote the additional average delay a user request forwarded
from surrogate j to the origin server of publisher i will experience. Let xji be the cache
space allocated to publisher i in surrogate j. If i th publisher’s investment in the j
th surrogate is Bji , then the total cache space allocated to the content of publisher
i in surrogate j is xji =
Bji
pj
. The average reduction in the user delay or equivalently










i as the gain factor for publisher i
from surrogate j.









. For a given pricing policy p the publisher optimization







Since Ui(xi) is a concave function and the constraint set is compact, there exists a


















)1/αi is the unique optimal solution to the optimization
problem (S).
Proof See appendix A.
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Figure 3.3: Elasticity of publisher investment when the cache size is infinite. α2 = 0.5.
βji = 1,∀i, j. p2 = 4, and p3 = 7.
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This result has been analyzed for a two publishers, three surrogates system, where
the total investment of each publisher is 20 cost units, and the sizes of the caches
of each surrogate is the same at 10 storage units. Figure 3.3 depicts the investment
of the publisher in a surrogate when a surrogate’s unit cache space price is varied,
while the prices of the remaining two surrogates’ are kept the same. The arrival rates
to each surrogate and the gain factors of each publisher-surrogate pair are the same.
The analysis does not take into account the limited cache capacities of the surrogates.
The investment in the surrogate decreases with the increasing price. However, more
importantly the investment is quite dependent on the distribution of requests for the
publisher’s content. In fact α = 1 represents a special case, where the publisher’s
investment in a surrogate is the same regardless of the price of the surrogate.
In Figure 3.4, the variation of total revenue generated by a surrogate publisher for
varying surrogate prices is depicted. In this case, as the surrogate lowers its price, it
receives higher investment from the publishers. However, lowering the price more than
a certain price reduces the revenue, because the surrogate has a limited cache space
and the publishers requests for more space cannot be satisfied.
3.3 Optimal Surrogate Strategy
We now consider the optimal pricing strategies of the surrogates maximizing their
revenues. Let p−j = (p1, p2, . . . , pj−1, pj+1, . . . , pJ) be the set of unit cache space prices
of all the surrogates in the network except the jth one. We assume that there is no
collaboration among the surrogates, and each surrogate tries to maximize their revenue





and the objective of the surrogate is to maximize rj(pj) by determining the optimal
price pj .
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Figure 3.4: Total revenue of surrogate for varying prices. α2 = 0.5. β
j
i = 1,∀i, j.
p2 = 4, p3 = 7.
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Lemma 2 Surrogate j’s best pricing strategy under a given fixed pricing policy p−j




i (pj) = Cj , i.e., when the surrogate cache is
completely allocated.
Proof See appendix A.




i (pj)pj achieves an interior
maximum because it tends to zero both as pj goes to zero and as pj goes to infinity.
Whether the function rj(pj) is maximized at the price that completely allocates sur-
rogate cache or at a higher price will depend on whether Cj is above or below this
maximum. However, in many practical cases the cache capacity is much lower than
the total information available in the network. Thus, the surrogate will be able to sell
all of its capacity without setting a price that approaches zero.
3.4 Publisher-Surrogate Distribution Game
Until now, we discussed the optimal strategies of the publishers and the surrogates
given that system is at a steady state. However, we have not discussed whether such
a steady state exists. Notice that when a surrogate re-evaluates its pricing policy
according to the pricing policies of the rival surrogates, the remaining surrogates will
do the same. At each different pricing policy the publishers’ optimal investments will
be different as well.
In order to understand the behavior of the surrogates, we model the two-stage
surrogate-publisher system as a non-cooperative game [41]. In this publisher-surrogate
distribution game, Γ(J, S, P ), the players, J , are the surrogates, the strategy set Sj for
a surrogate j is given by the surrogate’s unit cache space price and the payoff function
Pj(s) of each surrogate j is given by the profit of the jth surrogate. This system is
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similar to the Cournot oligopoly discussed in the economics literature. Assume that
each surrogate has a fixed cost for its cache, but has no control over the size of the
cache, i.e., the size of the cache is determined before the system implementation.
We first show that this game has a Nash equilibrium solution, where no surrogate
has incentive to change its strategy unilaterally, since each surrogate maximizes its
own individual payoff given the strategies of others.
Theorem 1 The non-cooperative publisher-surrogate distribution game Γ(J, S, P ) has
at least one Nash Equilibrium solution.
Proof We first show that the strategy sets are convex and compact. The profit for
surrogate j is rj(p)−cj , where cj is the cost of the surrogate j’s cache. We will assume
that there exists some price p̂j at which demand for the cache space of surrogate j is
zero regardless of the prices of other surrogates. Considering the revenue curve rj(p),
this is not a restricting assumption. Lemma 2 suggests that the optimal surrogate
price tends to zero when we deviate from the suggested optimal point. As an example,
consider Figure 3.4, in which the revenue of surrogate j increases until a certain price
p∗j beyond which it decreases again. Then, we may limit the strategy set Sj to the
interval [0, p̂j ], and still be able to cover the complete range of payoff function. Thus,
the strategy set Sj is convex and compact.
The profit of each surrogate is bounded from below by zero and since the total
investment of all publishers is limited, the profit can never exceed
∑
i Bi − cj . We
assume that surrogate takes its’ rivals actions as given, supposes they will remain
constant, and chooses its own best course of action accordingly. This assumption is
called Cournot behavioral assumption [41]. The payoff function under this assumption
is given by rj(p). In Lemma 2, we have shown that there is a unique best reply function,
58
Rj(p) = argmaxpj{rj(p)} for surrogate j, which is also continuous. Define a mapping
R(s) = (R1(s), . . . , RJ(s)). By Brouwer’s Theorem [41] R must have at least one fixed
point s∗ ∈ S, where s∗ = R(s∗). The definition of the best reply function Rj(s) and
Brouwer’s Theorem tell us that Pj(s∗) ≥ Pj(s∗/tj) for all tj ∈ Sj and j = 1, . . . , J ,
where s∗/tj is the strategy set when the jth surrogate’s strategy is changed to tj in
the complete strategy set s∗. This result is the definition of Nash equilibrium.
We have shown that there exists a set of equilibrium prices for such a system. The
question that remains to be addressed is what the physical interpretation of such an
equilibrium is.
Consider the publisher optimization problem (S) discussed in the previous section.
In our system, every publisher tries to maximize its own benefit regardless of others
subject to the availability of funds and caching space. The optimization problem of




i ≤ Cj for all surrogates,
i.e. the publishers compete for the available cache resources. Thus, we can re-write










xji ≤ Cj, j = 1, . . . , J.
Theorem 2 When there is a unique equilibrium for the publisher-surrogate distribu-
tion game, Γ(J, S, P ), the equilibrium prices solve the optimization problem Si for all
publishers i = 1, . . . , I , that is, the solution is globally Pareto optimum.
Proof Assume that each surrogate uses the best reply function Rj(p) to update
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i = Cj. At the equilibrium this condition is satisfied as well. Furthermore,
the publishers calculate xji as given by Lemma 1, which guarantees local optimality
of the solution and the feasibility of the first condition in Si. Uniqueness of the
equilibrium guarantees that the feasible locally optimum solution is also the global
optimum. Under these conditions, outcome of the publisher-surrogate game is the
solution of Si,∀i = 1, . . . , I.
Pareto optimality is the relevant criteria in a multi-objective problem setting such
as ours. At the pareto optimum solution, one can find no other feasible solution that
increases some objectives while not decreasing at least another objective. Theorem
2 states that if the equilibrium is unique, then the outcome of the non-cooperative
game is the optimal solution to the individual revenue maximization problems of the
publishers. If there are multiple equilibria, however; the resulting cache allocations,
x, are only locally optimum. Unfortunately, there are often multiple Nash equilibria
and depending on the initial prices as well as price update strategies the outcome
of the game may not always be the optimal solution. In the following, we discuss a
special case of the surrogate cache allocation problem, where the delay between each
publisher-surrogate pair is the same and user request arrival rates to each surrogate
and Zipf distributions for each publisher are identical. For this case, we determine the
condition for which unique equilibrium exists.
Definition 1 A mapping T (p) is called contraction mapping, if |T (p)−T (q)| ≤ λ|p−q|
for λ < 1 or if the mapping is differentiable ∂T (p)/∂p < 1.
It is easy to see that if the best-reply mapping R(p) is a Contraction mapping,
then the equilibrium is unique [61].
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Lemma 3 When βji = β, ∀i, j and αi = α, ∀i, then the best reply function Rj(p) is
a contraction mapping if the price vector p is limited to the region given by





Proof See appendix A.
Notice that the condition given in Lemma 3 is not a necessary but a sufficient
condition which is probably more restrictive than the necessary condition. Let Rj
be the region given by the above Lemma. Following Theorem gives the condition for
optimality of the outcome of the game for the identical case.
Theorem 3 If the range of the price vector, p, is in the region ∩Jj=1Rj, the publisher-
surrogate distribution game has a unique equilibrium.
Proof The result follows from Lemma 3 and Theorem 1.
In order to understand the consequences of this theorem, we consider a system
where there are only 3 surrogates. For demonstration purposes assume that α = 0.5.
Let Kj = (1 − α)∑i Bi/Cj . Figure 3.5 depicts the uniqueness property for different
values of Kj. The lines in the figure show the uniqueness condition satisfied with
equality. The region enclosed by these three price lines correspond to the region de-
scribed by Lemma 3, i.e. Rj . We have different regions for different surrogates. These
regions basically depend on Kj , which in turn depends on the publisher investments
and the size of the surrogate’s cache. We observe in Figure 3.5 that as K gets higher
Rj gets smaller. Theorem 3 states that if the prices are confined into the intersection
of these regions, we achieve a unique equilibrium. Notice that ∩Jj=1Rj = Rj0 for some




















K=2, p1(p2,p3)  
K=2, p2(p1,p3)  
K=2, p3(p1,p2)  
Figure 3.5: Rj for different surrogates.
We need to determine under what conditions the optimal surrogate prices lie in
this region. Figure 3.6 and 3.7 depicts the variation of optimal surrogate prices given
that the rest of the surrogates are required to select prices in the uniqueness region,
i.e. ∩Jj=1Rj. We varied the boundaries of the uniqueness region by changing K. Notice
that the number above each subplot corresponds to this K value. We noticed that for
low values of K, the optimal surrogate prices reside inside the uniqueness region, while
for high values of K the optimal prices tend to diverge from this region. Notice that low
K values mean the total investment is not much higher than individual surrogate’s
cache size. Thus, if the size of the surrogate caches are not very large and/or the
publishers are reluctant to invest high amounts in the surrogates, we expect the game
to converge to a unique price equilibrium.
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Figure 3.7: Variation of the optimal surrogate prices for different K.
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3.5 Selection of Publisher Investments
So far, we assumed that publisher investments are fixed and known. We now discuss
several possibilities for determining the investment amounts. Consider the following
optimization problem (P ). The objective of (P ) is to maximize the total publisher










xji ≤ Cj , j = 1, 2, . . . , J.






















































Thus, each publisher’s optimization problem is separate from the other given the
Lagrangian constant (shadow price) p. By using similar arguments as those given in
[62], one can easily show that the publishers can be induced to solve this optimization
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problem in a distributed fashion by surrogate charging, and dual optimal prices p∗
exist and x(p∗) is primal dual as well. The dual problem D(p) can be solved by using
gradient projection method [9], where the resource prices are adjusted in opposite
direction to the gradient ∇D(p).
pl(t + 1) = max{0, pl(t) − η∂D
∂pl
(p(t))}, (3.4)




i (p). This way, in each iteration publishers
individually determine their optimal xji and communicate their results to the surro-
gates. Surrogates then update their prices pj according to Eq.(3.4) and communicate
the new prices to the publishers and the cycle repeats.
Now, consider a publisher-surrogate game where a publisher selects an investment
maximizing the “net” publisher benefit. That is, the difference of the additional aver-
age benefit generated from using surrogates and the cost of using them is maximized.
Let T be the duration of time a publisher can rent the caching space from a surrogate.















It is easy to see that the solution to this problem is obtained when the constraint
is active i.e. satisfied with an equality. The solution to the optimization problem
described in Eq. (3.5) is
xji =
(













Similar to the case where the publishers have fixed investments, let rj(pj) denote
the total revenue generated by the surrogate j when it sets a price pj. One can








i (pj) ≤ Cj, the
optimal surrogate pricing strategy is the one that results in full utilization of the cache
resources. Thus, Theorem 1 still applies and the solution of this surrogate-publisher
game has an equilibrium.
It is easy to see that the dual system optimization problem D(p) is the same as
our market interpretation. The two solution methods should give the same result as
long as the investment for each server Bi is sufficiently large. This is due to the fact
that the best reply function in the publisher-surrogate game requires the demand to
be equal to the supply. However, Bi is usually a decision variable. Notice that a
server may be individually better off by investing less than the amount dictated by
the system optimum solution. Thus, a system optimum solution can only be achieved
by the distributed publisher-surrogate game by enforcing the publishers to pay the
charges associated with the system optimum solution.
Without such enforcement, we encounter a different optimization problem where
the investment amount is also a design parameter. In the resulting non-cooperative
game, publishers select their investment amounts to maximize their profits. We devel-
oped a suboptimal investment strategy for the publishers by assuming that the change
in the equilibrium prices is small when the change in the investments is small. For a









Assume that {pj} are the set of prices at the equilibrium. As for the key assumption of
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our derivation, we assume that for a small change in investment amounts, the change





ik/pk can be considered as constant. This assumption is verified
through numerical experiments. Assuming that this condition is satisfied, the optimal











Bi. Then it turns out that the optimal publisher investment is the solution to
















i γijBi = Cj ,∀j. Further details can be found in appendix B. The performance
of this method is evaluated numerically and the results are given in Section 3.7.
3.6 An Optimization-based Resource Pricing
Policy
The results given in the previous sections suggest that we may use a price-directed
market-based distributed algorithm for solving the two-stage publisher-surrogate cache
resource allocation problem. We consider the following algorithm for this purpose:
Resource Allocation Algorithm
1. Surrogates announce a set of initial prices p(0) = (p(0)1 , p
(0)
2 , . . . , p
(0)
J ).
2. At iteration k, each publisher i calculates its optimal cache demand for surrogate
j, xji
(k)
as given in Lemma 1. Forward these demands to the surrogates.










i and γ is the step size. Let ε > 0 be a sufficiently small constant







than the cache capacity Cj , then the new price p
(k+1)
j is increased, otherwise it
is decreased.
Announce the new prices p(k) to the publishers.
In this model, the system operates as follows: an initial set of prices is announced
to the publishers. The publishers determine their resource (cache) demands according
to these prices as well as the request rates, and the observed delays from the surrogates.
The publishers request these resources from the surrogates. Prices are then iteratively
changed to accommodate the demands for resources until the total demand equals to
the total amount of resources available.
The idea of using the optimality conditions to develop algorithms that solve an
optimization problem is not new. For example Kelly et al. [48], Yaiche et al. [85]
and Low et al. [62] have used this approach as well. These papers considered the
optimal flow control in broadband networks. While Kelly proposed a continuous time
algorithm in [48], Yaiche et al. and Low suggested discrete time algorithms. In each
case the algorithms have different properties associated with the optimization problem
they are designed for.
We next show that our algorithm indeed converges to the Nash equilibrium solu-




(pj − p̂j)2/γ, (3.9)
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where p̂j is the set of equilibrium prices satisfying xj(p̂j) = Cj. We consider V as a
candidate Lyapunov function associated with the subsequence {p(k)}. Notice that V
is convex, bounded and differentiable.
Theorem 4 Let {p(k)} be a sequence generated by the above algorithm for an arbitrary
initial value p(0) ∈ RJ and 0 < γ < 1. Then {p(k)} converges to {αp̂}, α ∈ R.
Proof Define Ej(p(k)) = xj(p(k))− Cj. We know that ∂V∂pj = 2/γ(pj − p̂j). It easy to
see that ∇V is Lipschitz continuous, that is:
‖∇V (p) −∇V (q)‖ ≤ L‖p − q‖,
for L = 1. Thus, by the descent lemma [8, Appendix A.24], we have the following:
V (p(k+1)) ≤ V (p(k)) + γE(p(k))∇V (p(k)) + ‖γE(p)‖2
= V (p(k)) + 2
∑
j









2(p(k)j − p̂j) + γ2Ej(p(k))
]
Ej(p(k)) (3.10)
Notice that from the definition of the algorithm, the following is true:
p
(k+1)
j − p(k)j = γEj(p(k)), (3.11)
for p(k+1)j > ε. Consider the following two cases:
• p(k)j ≤ p̂j
For this case from Lemma 2 we know that Ej > 0. By definition of the algorithm
p
(k)
j ≤ p(k+1)j ≤ p̂j . Then from Eq.(3.11),
p
(k)
j − p̂j ≤ p(k)j − p(k+1)j
= −γEj(p(k)).
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Now, consider the second term on the right hand side of Eq.(3.10) and the above
result,
2(p(k)j − p̂j) + γ2Ej(p(k)) ≤ (p(k)j − p̂j) − γEj(p(k)) + γ2Ej(p(k))
= (p(k)j − p̂j) − γ(1 − γ)Ej(p(k))
≤ p(k)j − p̂j,
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that 0 < γ < 1. Thus,




and since the second term on the right hand side of above inequality is negative,
V (p(k+1)) ≤ V (p(k)).
• p(k)j > p̂j
For this case from Lemma 2 we know that Ej > 0. By definition of the algorithm
p
(k)
j ≥ p(k+1)j ≥ p̂j . Then from Eq.(3.11),
p
(k)
j − p̂j ≥ p(k+1)j − p̂j
= −γEj(p(k)).
Similar to the previous case, consider the second term on the right hand side of
Eq.(3.10) and the above result,
2(p(k)j − p̂j) + γ2Ej(p(k)) ≥ (p(k)j − p̂j) − (1 − γ)(p(k)j − p̂j)
≥ p(k)j − p̂j ,
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where the last inequality follows from the assumption that 0 < γ < 1. Thus,




since Ej(p(k)) < 0. The second term on the right hand side is negative, which
leads to V (p(k+1)) ≤ V (p(k)).
Given that V (p(k+1)) ≤ V (p(k)) for all k, the level set {p ∈ RJ |V (p) ≤ V (p0)}
is compact. Therefore {p(k)} is bounded, and it has at least one limit point. The
subsequence {p(k)} converges to the stationary point of V (i.e. ∇V (p) = 0) since
∇V is continuous and limk→∞∇V (p(k)) = 0. However, notice that there are multi-
ple stationary points, since xji (p) is a homogeneous function of first degree and thus
Ej(αp) = 0, j = 1, 2, . . . , J for α ∈ R.
3.7 Numerical Analysis
We compare the outcome of our algorithm with current caching systems that store
the most popular data in their cache. We model the current system for our purposes














portion of the caching space to publisher
i. Notice that, in fact this algorithm is better than the current implementation, since
it considers the importance of a particular surrogate for a publisher. That is, if the
requests of publisher i are arriving mainly from the network serviced by the surrogate
j, surrogate j gives more caching space to publisher i than the rest of publishers.
We compare the performance of the game-theoretical and conventional caching
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algorithms according to the total publisher revenues. We again consider the two-
publisher and three-surrogate system as illustrated in Figure 3.1. We compare the
performances of two methods when the skewness of the system is increased. Specifi-
cally, we consider the case when one of the publishers receives more benefit from one of
the surrogates while the other publisher receives more benefit from another surrogate.
We expect each of the methods to find the appropriate allocation that maximizes the
publisher benefits.
Unlike the previous studies, which were interested in the cache hit/miss ratio,
we consider the total publisher benefit as the relevant comparison criterion. Notice
that when the required quality of service is not satisfied, users stop browsing the web
page, which leads to lower revenues for the publishers. In this work, we assumed that
different publishers have different contents with varying levels of QoS and their benefit
of delivering a content to a user is also different, and the objective of each publisher
is to maximize its revenue.
In this analysis we assume that the total investment of each publisher and the cache
sizes of all surrogates are the same. Let ζji = wi(dij)/χ
1−αi







Figure 3.8 depicts the improvement of game-theoretic algorithm over the conventional
caching solution. In this figure we compare the two algorithms for varying request
arrival rates. When the request arrival rates are equal to 1, then the solution given by
the game-theoretical algorithm and the conventional algorithm is the same. However,
as the arrival rates become smaller or greater than 1, we observe that game-theoretical
algorithm gives better performance.
In Figures 3.9 and 3.10 we consider the performance improvement when the arrival
rates are fixed, but ζ is varied. From the definition of ζji and assuming that wi(·) is
the same for all publishers, one can note that by varying ζji , basically we change the
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Figure 3.8: The effects of varying arrival rates. α1 = α2 = 0.1. ζ
j
i = 1,∀i, j. λ11 =
λ32 = λ. λ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 3).
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Figure 3.9: The effects of varying skewness in the network measured by varying the
benefit received from several surrogates. α1 = α2 = 0.1. ζ11 = ζ
3
2 = ζ. ζ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
=
(1, 1), (2, 3). λ11 = λ
3
2 = 3. λ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 3).
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delay between surrogate j and publisher i. As illustrated in Figure 3.9, as the skewness
of the system increases the performance of the game-theoretic algorithm gets better
compared to the conventional algorithm. However, this improvement is larger for low
values of ζji . This means that the surrogate does not have to be very close to the users.
We may place surrogates at locations at somewhat greater distance and thus service
more users for better efficiency.
Figure 3.10 depicts the performance when the publisher request characteristic is
varied, i.e. when αi parameter in the Zipf distribution of publisher i is varied. We
observe that for larger values of αi the improvement of the game-theoretic algorithm
is smaller. This is reasonable considering that when αi = 1, the investment of a
publisher is independent of the prices. In that case, the game-theoretic algorithm’s
solution reduces to the conventional algorithm’s solution.
In Figure 3.11, we compare the performance of outcome of the game discussed
in section 3.5. In Figure 3.11, Alg.1 refers to the fixed investment method, where
B1 = B2 = 10, and Alg.2 refers to the optimal selection of the publisher investments
leading to the maximum total system revenue according to the discussions in section
3.5. As discussed in the previous section, we expect that the total utility achieved
by this game to be higher than the case when the investments are a priorly assigned.
Indeed, Figure 3.11 verifies this intuition. It is interesting to note however that,
while the system optimum investment amounts maximize the total system utility, they
lead to lower utilities for some of the publishers compared to their utilities under the
current caching methods. Furthermore, the investment amounts leading to the system
optimum are usually very high, reducing any benefit received from the use of the
caches in the first place. A short-sighted objective of maximizing total system utility
thus seems non-implementable, when the system is formed by selfish non-cooperative
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Figure 3.10: The effects of varying skewness when the user request distribution is
different for the publishers. α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.4. ζ11 = ζ
3
2 = ζ. ζ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
=
(1, 1), (2, 3). λ11 = λ
3
2 = 3. λ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 3).
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Total Utility Alg.1   
Total Utility Alg.2   
Server 1 utility Alg1 
Server 2 utility Alg.1
Server 1 utility Alg.2
Server 2 utility Alg.2
Figure 3.11: The illustration of system optimum solution does not increase all of the
publishers benefits. α1 = 0.1, α2 = 0.4. ζ11 = ζ
3
2 = ζ. ζ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 







2 = 3. λ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 3), (2, 3).
agents. We need to determine publisher investments that maximize the total system
utility as much as possible, while keeping individual publisher benefits (or profits)
higher than those under current solutions.
Thus we next consider the optimal investment strategies that maximize the pub-
lisher profits. Unfortunately, since the system is complex, we had to resort to an
approximation. In this approximation, we assume that the change in the equilibrium
prices is small when the change in the investments is small as well. We have verified
this assumption through numerical studies. Given this assumption, we determined a
sub-optimum investment strategy. The details and the derivation of our sub-optimal
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Server 1 Profit Improvement
Server 2 Profit Improvement
Total Revenue Decrease
Figure 3.12: The improvements suggested by near-optimum investment strategy as
compared with fixed investments B1 = B2 = 10. α1 = α2 = 0.5. ζ11 = ζ32 = ζ.
ζji = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 3). λ11 = λ12 = λ31 = λ32 = 3. λji = 1,∀(i, j) 
=
(1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 3), (2, 3).
publisher investment strategy can be found in appendix B. Figure 3.12 depicts the
improvement in the publisher profits compared to the a priori fixed investment case,
where the fixed investment is 10. The system setup is similar to the previous numer-
ical examples, and the improvement is considered for varying gain factors. We also
depicted the reduction in the total publisher utility as compared to the optimal system
utility. The cache rental period is 100 time units.
In Figure 3.13 we plot the change in improvement if the fixed investment was
higher. In this case both publishers invest 15 units. In Figure 3.14 we show the change
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in improvement if the skewness is increased further. We assumed that the gain factor
of publisher 2 for the cache of surrogate 2 is also varied. In both of these figures, we
observe that the improvement in the publisher profits is significant when the publishers
are allowed to optimally vary their investments. Furthermore, it is interesting to note
that the aggregate publisher utilities suggested by the non-cooperative method is very
close to the system optimum. Notice that the system optimum required very high
investments, which may diminish any benefit of using a caching system. Thus, we
can say that the non-cooperative system can achieve high system efficiency without
requiring any outside intervention.
We also noticed that the improvement in the profits reduce as the gain factors
increase. The reason for this observation is that the profits of the publisher either
with the fixed investments or with the optimal investments increase as the gain factors
increase. However, for a given gain factor, the increase in the profit due to using the
optimal investment is much lower than this increase. Thus, the rate of improvement
decreases with the increase in the gain factor.
3.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, we analyzed a two-stage publisher-surrogate market-based resource
allocation system. The objective was to deliver the contents to the users as rapidly
as possible, so that users do not stop browsing the web sites. We assumed that
the publisher contents are different and require varying levels of quality of service.
When the required quality of service (e.g. latency) is not satisfied, the users start
bailing-out according to some probability distribution. In this analysis, we showed
that the publisher-surrogate game that models the system leads to an equilibrium.
Under certain conditions we showed that this equilibrium is the optimal solution for
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Total Profit Improvement   
Server 1 Profit Improvement
Server 2 Profit Improvement
Total Revenue Decrease     
Figure 3.13: The improvement suggested by the near-optimum investment strategy
as compared with fixed investments B1 = B2 = 15. α1 = α2 = 0.5. ζ11 = ζ32 = ζ.
ζji = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 3). λ11 = λ12 = λ31 = λ32 = 3. λji = 1,∀(i, j) 
=
(1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 3), (2, 3).
81












Server 1 Profit Improvement
Server 2 Profit Improvement
Total Revenue Decrease
Figure 3.14: The improvement suggested by the sub-optimum investment strategy.




2 = ζ. ζ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 3), (2, 2). λ11 = λ12 = λ31 =
λ32 = 3. λ
j
i = 1,∀(i, j) 
= (1, 1), (2, 1), (1, 3), (2, 3).
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the non-cooperative resource allocation problem. The importance of our model is that
it closely resembles the real-world situation, where the servers and users does not
collaborate to achieve the system optimal solution. Instead every agent in the system
tries to maximize their benefits without consideration of others. We also showed that
the competition among surrogates leads to a solution that is better than the solution
provided by conventional caching methods. Furthermore, we obtained the surrogate
pricing strategies that maximize the total publisher benefit, which we consider as
the system optimum. We noticed that the non-cooperative publisher-surrogate game,
where the publishers also vary their investment to maximize their profits, leads to an
equilibrium solution which is not far from system optimum and improves the publisher
profits significantly. This result strongly suggests that the non-cooperative structure




In this chapter, we focus on request-routing sub-system. We assume that the publish-
ers disseminate their content to appropriate surrogates in one or more CDNs with the
coordination of distribution sub-systems. CDNs peer with each other so that a client
request may be diverted to the surrogate of another CDN, whenever it is optimal to
do so. Peered CDNs keep information about the content and the network state of
their own and each others’ surrogates. We assume that the RRS has the informa-
tion on the content and the network state of every surrogate in-house or peered (by
bloom-filters, delta updates, periodical polling, etc). According to this information,
the client requests are directed to the most appropriate surrogate. CDNs offer the
publishers a SLA, which specifies the average delay observed by the clients accessing
publishers content. The propagation and processing delay between the surrogate and
client network is known by the RRS. Surrogates charge a fee for each client request
served. This price can be considered as the shadow-price reflecting the current load
on the servers. The objective of the RRS is to keep the average delay experienced by
the clients of a publisher below a negotiated value while minimizing the total service
cost.
Previous work in this field include the work-in-progress specifying the architecture
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and issues in Content Distribution Inter-networking by the Internet Working Groups
and the Content Alliance [25], [34], [68], [2], [6] and [14]. Recently Biliris et al. [11]
considered the issues in request routing in peered CDNs. In their work, the authors
considered methods for forwarding the client requests to the CDNs/surrogates. They
suggested a DNS re-routing based scheme that they call Intelligent DNS (IDNS).
IDNS dynamically updates the routing table for DNS engine in real-time according
to the observed network state. The routing decision tries to balance the load in the
surrogates. However, the authors did not specify an optimal load balancing method.
Our work focuses on this routing decision and we develop a dynamical algorithm that
is both scalable and robust and that minimizes a measure of service cost.
We also discuss the surrogate-publisher routing game. In the previous chapter, we
assumed that the routing decisions are given and the publishers determine their dis-
semination strategy depending on the surrogate caching space prices. In this chapter,
we first investigate the game where the publishers (or, on their behalf, the CDNs)
determine the routing of the user requests to the surrogates given the publisher dis-
semination strategy. We show that such a game has an equilibrium, but the existence
of this equilibrium depends on the structure of the game. Specifically, we show that an
equilibrium exists, if the publishers auction for the bandwidth resources (i.e. routing)
instead of requesting a maximum delay bound. Later, we combine the dissemination
and routing games and show that this combined game has an equilibrium.
The chapter is organized as follows: in the next section we develop the model for the
request-routing sub-system and define the minimum cost delay-constrained application
level routing problem. This approach differs from the previous section, where the
publishers determine their SLA and optimize their resource allocations according to
the cost of the service. We note that a different perspective to the problem appears,
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when the users request a SLA and the CDN tries to deliver this SLA at a minimum
cost to the publishers. They may deliver the SLA at a minimum cost to the publisher
to prevent the competing CDNs taking away the business of the publishers. In section
4.2, we give a method to determine a tight lower bound to the problem, and define
a near-optimal routing algorithm. In section 4.3, we evaluate the performance of this
algorithm as compared to the lower bound. Section 4.4 gives a definition of the routing
game in the same line of the previous chapter. This section discusses the existence of
equilibrium of the routing game, while the following section investigates the existence
of equilibrium for the combined dissemination and routing game.
4.1 System Model and Problem Formulation
A publisher and CDN makes a Service Level Agreement (SLA), which specifies the
maximum average delay observed by the users accessing the publisher’s content. The
objective of the RRS is to minimize the total service cost (and thus to maximize the
profit), while satisfying all the publishers’ SLAs.
This is a very practical problem that has to be solved by the CDNs in order
to maximize their profits, while honoring their contracts to the publishers. We may
identify several cases, where the service costs appear: it may be the case that the CDN
has no surrogates of its own and only acts as an intermediary between the publishers
and the ISPs with caching space to rent. Then, the surrogate service fee refers to
a real monetary cost for the CDN. Even though the CDN has it own surrogates, it
may charge a fee to those user requests re-directed from the peer CDNs. Moreover,
the number of user requests that a surrogate can serve simultaneously is limited and
the surrogates may employ nonlinear pricing schemes to avoid congestion. Nonlinear
pricing schemes have attracted much attention recently especially in the network flow
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control for their implicit property of admission control [65], [79], [77]. Nonlinear pricing
relies on the fact that the admission of a new user would reduce the available resources
for the users that are already being serviced. This reduction in available resources per
user then relates to an increase in the average service delay. The cost of the total
increased service delay is reflected by the shadow price that a new user has to pay to
get service given the current server load. Not all users value the resources the same.
Thus, the users that does not want to pay the higher costs associated with the use
of resources leave and the congestion is relieved. In our work, we minimize the total
service cost given a source of surrogate fees. Such an objective is required by the
CDNs to maximize their profits.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the operation of the system. We may consider the RRS as
an enhanced version of a DNS server for our purposes. Users are located at mutually
exclusive networks, which may correspond to the networks of the different local ISP.
User requests are first directed to the corresponding CDN’s request-routing subsystem
via DNS resolution. Each CDN may serve one or more of the user networks. Usually
different CDNs do not serve the same user network, unless they are peer CDNs. The
RRS determines a suitable surrogate to serve the user request and informs the user
of the location of this surrogate. For our purposes, we may envision in-house and
peered surrogates as equivalent, as long as the RRS have sufficient information on
peered surrogates such as their service price and distance to the client networks. The
user having received the identification of the surrogate, requests the object from that
surrogate.
We assume that the SLA is specified as the average delay experienced by the
clients accessing a publisher. Let Dj denote the average delay bound requested by the




















Figure 4.1: RRS Architecture.
among the set of Sij = {s0, s1, . . .} surrogate servers. Let s0 be the origin server for
the requested object and contains all of the content. Notice that the number of objects
in the Internet is quite high and it is not usually feasible to store the information of
all the surrogates that store each of the objects. Instead, the RRS stores a summary
of the surrogate cache content as suggested by such previous works as [26] and [73].
Thus, there is a possibility that some of the requested objects cannot be found in the
surrogates. In that case, the surrogate requests the object from the origin server on
behalf of the user. We consider the propagation and transmission delays together.
When a user request from network n is routed to the surrogate s, the average retrieval
delay experienced by the user is dns , which includes both average propagation and
transmission delays, including the delay required to fetch the object from the origin
server when the object is not found in the surrogate cache. Assume that each content
unit is of equal size. The request arrival rate for content i in publisher j from client
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network n is given by λnij .The unit service price of surrogate s is ps. Let x
n
ij(s) = 0 or 1
be the decision variable denoting the surrogate server serving the client requests from
network n for the object i in publisher j.
The objective of the CDN is to minimize the total cost of service of all user requests,
while satisfying the individual average delay bounds for the publishers. The following



























ij(s) ≤ Dj, ∀j
∑
s∈Sij
xnij(s) = 1, ∀n, i, j.
This problem has close affinity to the delay-constrained routing problem investi-
gated in the context of ATM networks, e.g. [87] and [74]. In the delay-constrained
routing problem, clients are connected with each other over a multi-hop path. Each
hop traversed in the network creates a delay and it is required that each connec-
tion’s end-to-end delay is lower than a negotiated value. In our work, we consider
application-level routing, so the client and the destination is always at single “hop1”
distance. Contrary to the delay-constrained routing in ATM networks, the user con-
nections are coupled in the sense that overall average delay experienced by the clients
of a publisher should be lower than a negotiated delay. (P ) is an integer program-
ming problem and it was shown that the similar delay-constrained routing problem is
NP-complete [17].
1Notice that user packets may traverse multiple network elements/links to reach the server.
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4.2 Lower Bound and a Near-Optimal Routing Algorithm
We determine a tight lower bound to (P ) by solving the dual problem. We dualize
the problem (P ) with respect to the first constraint. Let αj ≥ 0 be the Lagrangian
constant.





































xnij(s) = 1, ∀n, i, j.




1 if s = arg mins∈Sij{ps + αjdns },
0 otherwise.
(4.3)
By weak duality we can determine a lower bound for (P ) as the solution of maxαj ZD(αj),
since ZD(αj) is non-differentiable, we have to resort to one of the approximation meth-
ods available in the literature. We consider the sub-gradient method (see e.g. [8] for de-













Dj . The iterations are αk+1j = αkj + skgkj , where αkj ≥ 0 and sk is the step size. The
new iterate may not improve the dual cost for all values of the step size; however, if
the step size is small enough, the distance of the current iterate to the optimal solution
set is reduced.








′) = 1 for s′ such that dns′ ≤ djmin, then the delay constraint is satisfied. Let
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S′(i, j, n) = {s ∈ Sij : dns ≤ djmin} denote the set of surrogates satisfying this property
for the corresponding object for the users in network n. Furthermore, if we choose s′′
as s′′ = arg min{ps : s ∈ S′(i, j, n)}, that is for each client network and object such
that ps′′ corresponds to the minimum price offered by the surrogates satisfying the
delay constraint, then we get an upper bound for problem (P ).
Notice that due to the strictness of the constraint dns′ ≤ djmin, the gap between
the delay bound and the total average delay under this scheme is quite large. Our
near-optimal algorithm relies on reducing this gap intelligently, while reducing the
total cost as much as possible. We first give our algorithm in detail:
• For each publisher j,
– Determine
S′(i, j, n) = {s ∈ Sij : d(s, n) ≤ djmin}
s(i, j, n) = arg min{ps : s ∈ S′(i, j, n)}
S(i, n) = {s(i, j, n) : ∀i, n}













s(i,j,n) ≤ Dj update the routing decisions as (i∗, n∗, l∗) =
arg maxl∈Sij ,i,n{wn(s, l) : s ∈ S(i, n), ps − pl > 0}, s(i∗, j, n∗) = l∗.
In this algorithm, initially starting from the routing scheme resulting in the upper
bound, we reduce the total cost iteratively by reducing the slack in the delay con-
straint. While increasing the total average delay to the delay bound, we choose the
new surrogates that reduce the cost the most with minimum increase in the associated
delay. This is performed by calculating for each user network the “benefit coefficient,”
wn(k, l), which corresponds to the reduction in total cost per unit increase in delay
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by switching from the current surrogate assignment to a new one. In a greedy fashion
we re-assign the user networks maximizing this coefficient while still maintaining the
delay bound.
4.3 Numerical Analysis
Our objective in these numerical studies is to evaluate the performance of the proposed
routing algorithms compared to the lower bound for different network conditions.
First, we determine the lower bound by the sub-gradient method. The maximum
number of iterations for the sub-gradient solution to the dual problem is 1000. The
step size is sk = δ
Zup−ZD(αkj )
||gk||2 , where Zup is the total cost corresponding to the upper
bound and δ is a constant. We initialize δ to be 2, but it is halved of its value when
the objective value of the dual problem does not improve for 30 iterations.
The set-up corresponding to Figure 4.2 assumes that there are 10 publishers with
10 distinct objects. There are 10 client networks and 10 different surrogates. All
surrogates contain all the objects published. The distance between a surrogate and a
client network is given by dns = |s − n| + 1, where s, n = 1, 2, . . . , 10 are the indices of
the corresponding surrogate and network respectively. The cost of service is given by
ps = |5− s|+ 1. This choice of distance matrix and service costs ensure heterogeneity
in the network. The client requests for individual objects in the publishers content
is distributed according to Zipf distribution with skewness parameter β = 0.52. As
shown in recent studies, Zipf distribution closely approximates the Web traffic [13].
The arrival rate for client requests to each publisher is assumed to be 1 request per
second. The delay bound for each publisher is assumed to be the same. From Figure
2Probability that ith object is requested is, Pr(i) = c/iβ , where c is the normalization constant.
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Figure 4.2: Total cost for uniform delay bound.
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Figure 4.3: Total cost for non-uniform delay bound.
4.2 we observe that our algorithm can perform near-optimally compared to the lower
bound. Furthermore, we observe that as we increase the number of objects published,
the performance gets even better.
In Figure 4.3, we plot the effect of non-uniform delay bounds. We assume that
users accessing the content of the publisher j should experience total average delay
less than (1+j/2)∗d, where d is varied in the simulation. We observe that our routing
algorithm still provides performance close to the lower bound. We notice that when
d > 22, our lower bound is no longer tight. From this point onwards the lower bound
begins to correspond to un-realizable routing schemes. Another lower bound can be
determined by routing all requests to the surrogate with the least price. In most cases
this lower bound is not tight, but we may consider it when the lower bound given by
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Figure 4.4: Total cost for non-uniform delay bound and non-uniform arrival rates.
the dual problem is no longer realizable.
In Figure 4.4, we show the effects of non-uniform arrival rates. While everything
else is kept the same as in the previous analysis, we assume that the arrival rates are
given as λni,j = (j + n)Pr(i). Our proposed algorithm has a performance close to the
lower bound.
4.4 Publisher-Surrogate Routing Game
While the RRS determines the best routing strategy minimizing the total cost, each
surrogate updates its price ps according to the prices of the other surrogates and the
routing decision of the RRS. An important question is whether such a system has an
equilibrium or not.
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First we observe that when each publisher has a high number of objects, we may
consider the total request arrival rate from network n to surrogate s for those objects











for most of the objects. As I → ∞, there always exists a routing strategy xni,j(s)
that gives the desired λnj (s). Thus, as I → ∞, the optimization problem (P ) can be


























Let dtotsn (j) denote the average delay experienced by the user requests from network n
for the objects in the publisher j, when those requests are routed to surrogate s. Notice








sn (j) involves the average propagation delay between the
surrogate and the network, the transmission delay associated with the surrogate and
when the requested object is not found in the surrogate the average propagation delay
to the publisher.
As discussed in the previous chapter for the allocation of caching resources, the
surrogates still have the objective of maximizing their revenues, but this time by
selling/renting their transmission resources. Notice that the surrogate optimization
problem for the allocation of transmission resources is almost the same as the one









j (s)}ps, where λnj (s) is the solution to (P ′). If rs(ps) is con-
tinuous and concave, then it is known from Lemma 1 that the equilibrium exists.
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In order for rs(ps) to be continuous, λnj (s) must be continuous with respect to
ps. In the literature, the conditions for the continuity of the solution of a linear
program, when the objective and the constraint set is changing linearly with respect
to a parameter are rarely considered. Most recently, Korilis and Lazar [53] considered
the continuity of the solution to a linear program in the context of network flow control.
In this work, the users determine their rate by adjusting their window size according to
the decisions of the users in the system. The users are assumed to be non-cooperative.
The authors investigate the conditions under which an equilibrium exists. They show
that the best-reply function is the solution to a linear program which depends on
the window size of other users. As discussed in the previous chapter, an equilibrium
exists when the best-reply function is continuous. In a more general context, sufficient
conditions for the continuity of the set of solutions to a parameterized maximization
problem are given by the “maximum theorem,” due to Berge [7], which is one of the
fundamental theorems employed in mathematical economics.
Theorem 5 Berge’s maximum theorem [7]
Let X,Y be the subsets of two finite dimensional Euclidean spaces. Let C : X → Y
be a compact-valued correspondence and f : X × Y → R be a continuous function.
Γ : X → Y , Γ(x) = arg maxy∈C(x) f(x, y) is the solution to the optimization problem.
Also, define F : X → R, F (x) = maxy∈C(x) f(x, y). Then, if C is continuous at x ∈ X,
then Γ is closed and upper semi-continuous at x, and F is continuous at x.
From Berge’s maximum theorem, it is easy to see that the total cost to (P ′) is
continuous and λnj (s) is upper semi-continuous. However, careful consideration of (P
′)
hints that λnj (s) is not usually lower semi-continuous. Thus, rs(ps) is not continuous
either. In such a case, the equilibrium does not exist. Korilis and Lazar has developed
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another condition for the continuity of the linear programs.
Theorem 6 Korilis-Lazar Continuity Principle [53]
Consider the following linear program continuously parameterized by x ∈ X: maxy{c(x)y |A(x)y =
b(x), y ≥ 0}. If there exists a compact set of solutions, W ⊂ Rk, that is common for all
dual programs with parameter x, then the solution to the linear program is continuous.














s.t. dtotsn (j)πj + µjn ≤ ps,∀j, n, s.
A straightforward observation of the dual program suggests that the set of solutions
to dual program does not have a common subset for all ps ∈ R+, since the optimal
solution to the dual program increases with increasing ps. The abovementioned two
theorems suggest that the linear program (P ′) is usually not continuous, so there is
no equilibrium for the routing game.
Thus, we see that if the game is a solution to the linear program minimizing the
total cost subject to a delay constraint, an equilibrium usually does not exit. However,
an equilibrium exists when the publishers and surrogates play a game in which each
try to maximize its own benefit similar to the distribution sub-problem discussed in
the previous chapter. Consider (P ′′j ) as follows:















j (s) ≤ Brj ,
where Brj is the publisher j’s total investment in the routing services (i.e. bandwidth
allocation on the surrogates) and α → 0 is present to make (P ′′j ) similar to the dis-
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tribution sub-problem and it allows us to use the already proven results. Notice that
as α → 0, the solution of (P ′′j ) will not be affected by this factor. (P ′′j ) minimizes the
total average delay for each publisher j, given that the total cost of service does not
exceed the publisher’s willingness to pay. (P ′) and (P ′′j ) are analogous problems. In
the first case, the publisher (or, on behalf, of the publisher the RRS) minimizes the
cost subject to the condition that the average delay does not exceed the delay bound,
while in the second case, the publisher minimizes its delay bound subject to the cost
of service does not exceed its investment. Furthermore, in the first case, the publisher
determines its delay bound so that its net benefit is maximized, and in the second
case, the publisher selects its investment amount with the same objective in mind.
We have shown in the previous chapter that the game defined by (P ′′) and the
surrogate revenue maximization problem has an equilibrium due to Theorem 1. The
optimal surrogate pricing strategy is the one that completely allocates the available
bandwidth capacity among the users.
The main reason (P ) does not lead to an equilibrium, but (P ′′j ) does, is that in (P ′′j )
the surrogates have the information about the publishers’ willingness to pay. Thus,
they cannot increase the prices unboundedly. By stating their investment amount,
the publishers’ are essentially participating in an auction. The surrogates set prices
according to the outcome of this auction. Without the publisher investment amounts
or as in an auction bids, the surrogates are unaware how willing the publishers are for
achieving their requested average delay bound. Without such knowledge it is optimal
for surrogates to charge arbitrarily large prices knowing that publishers’ must purchase
services to satisfy their delay requirements. Then, with such high prices the publishers
cannot afford to get service from the surrogates and the demand goes to zero. When
the demand goes to zero, the surrogates reduce their prices to arbitrarily small values
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to compete with the origin server, and this process repeats itself. Obviously, such a
system does not lead to an equilibrium.
However, the results that we derived in the previous sections are still relevant,
since as we will discuss in the coming section, it is usually the case that there is a
general equilibrium. At the general equilibrium the participants individually have
negligible effect on the outcome of the system, since there are many publishers and
surrogates. When there is a general equilibrium, auctions are not needed to allocate
the resources. The CDN has the sufficient knowledge of the network state to offer
a tariff to the publishers with respect to several parameters including the requested
delay bound, arrival rates, etc. Thus, the publishers can select a maximum delay
bound maximizing their benefit, and the CDN can route the user requests accordingly
with the objective of minimizing the total cost.
4.5 Combined Dissemination-Routing Game
In this section, we discuss the existence of the equilibrium for the combined dissemination-
routing game. First, we consider the case where each agent (publisher or surrogate)
can affect the outcome of the game. This corresponds to the partial equilibrium in
microeconomics. Later, we discuss the existence of the general equilibrium, when there
are many agents with infinitesimal effects.
4.5.1 Partial Equilibrium
In this chapter we showed that the surrogate-routing game has an equilibrium. We
also showed in the previous chapter that the publisher-surrogate dissemination game
has an equilibrium. These two games are inter-related. The optimal cache allocations
depend on the arrival rates to the surrogates. Meanwhile, the optimal arrival rates
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to the surrogates depend on the delay associated with each surrogate, which in turn
depends on the cache hit probability and thus the cache allocation. We now determine
some equilibrium results for this combined game.







xsj ≤ Ccaches , ∀s
∑
j
λsj ≤ CBWs , ∀s,
where xsj and λ
s
j are the caching and transmission resources allocated to publisher j
at the surrogate s respectively and Ccaches and CBWs are the caching and bandwidth


















































Notice that apart from the selection of the investment amounts in the caching and
transmission resources, Bcachej and BBWj respectively, the optimization problem in
Eq. (4.9) is the dual optimization problem of Eq. (4.8), where pcaches and pBWs can
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be considered as the Lagrangian constants (or shadow prices) corresponding to the
constraints in Eq. (4.7). Thus, similar to the discussion in Chapter 3 if the investments
are sufficiently large and if the corresponding game has an unique equilibrium, then
the game theoretical solution is equal to the system optimum.
We now show that this combined game has an equilibrium for a given set of invest-
ments by showing that the corresponding best reply function is continuous. Notice
that the output of the routing game is βsj while the output of the distribution game is
xsj . From the previous chapter we know the best cache dissemination strategy given























j , Bcachej is the total investment of the publisher j
in caching and dupperjs is the average delay observed between the publisher and the
surrogate (notice that links among the publishers and the surrogates form the upper
layer in this hierarchy.) For our purposes wj(·) is a concave function referring to the
benefit received from reducing the average delay by the corresponding amount. For
simplicity, we assume for the following discussion that wj(d
upper
js ) = κjd
upper
js .
The routing sub-problem solves the optimization problem (P ′′j ) as discussed in the

















The delay dtotsn (j) is the total average delay observed by the users from network n and
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routed to the surrogate s when they are interested in the objects from the publisher
j, i.e.
dtotsn (j) = d
upper
js (1 − Pr(hit)) + dlowersn . (4.11)
Let dlowersn correspond to the sum of transmission and propagation delays associated
with the user request originating in network n and routed to the surrogate s (notice
that the user networks and the surrogates form the lower layer in this hierarchy.)
Notice that although the transmission delay is a function of the load of the surrogate,
due to the optimality of operating at the full load we may assume that the transmission
delay equals to the full load transmission delay and is a constant. When an object from
















to be used by the distribution sub-problem. In fact, these two sub-problems can be
considered as a single onto function, since given a β ∈ B a new β′ ∈ B is determined.
If this function is continuous, then from the Brouwer’s Theorem it has a fixed point.
Such a fixed point constitutes the equilibrium point of the combined game. In fact it is
easy to see that βsj
′ as given by Eqs.(4.10) and (4.12) is continuous in dtotsn (j) for all set
of prices pBW and dtotsn (j) is continuous for in βsj for all p
cache. Thus βsj
′ is continuous
in βsj and a fixed point exists. We thus proved the following theorem.
Theorem 7 The combined distribution and routing games have an equilibrium for a
given set of publisher investments Bcache and BBW .
We have performed numerical experiments to investigate the performance of this
combined game theoretical algorithm as compared to the current caching systems.
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Network 1 Network 2
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Figure 4.5: Example network for investigating the performance of the game theoretical
allocation strategy.
We considered a simple network architecture, where there are two origin web servers
and a CDN with three surrogates. There are two local area networks from where
the user requests are generated. The duration of simulation even for such a simple
network architecture is considerable, so we did not pursue more complicated network
architectures. However, this network still gives a good idea about the improvements
in the user delays by using game theoretical allocation strategies. The network delays
among the publishers and the surrogates as well as the surrogates and the user networks
are given in the Figure 4.5.
The game theoretical algorithm works as described in this section and Section
3.7. We model the current caching systems for our purposes as follows. The user
requests are intercepted by the closest proxy (surrogate) to the user network. The
proxies allocate caching space to the server contents with respect to the popularity
of the objects and the server investments. Specifically, we assume that each proxy
cache performs Least Frequently Used (LFU) cache management algorithm, which is
weighted by the caching investments of the origin servers. If the requested object is
found in the proxy and if the proxy is not overloaded (i.e. number of user requests are
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Game Theoretical Soln for Pub. 1
Current Caching Soln for Pub. 1
Game Theoretical Soln for Pub 2
Current Caching Soln for Pub 2
Figure 4.6: Comparison of average delays that user requests observe when they are
served by a caching system. Publisher investments are the same.
not more than the available transmission/processing capacity of the proxy), then the
request is immediately served. Otherwise, the user request is forwarded to the origin
server. Total number of objects available in each origin server is 100, while only 10
objects can be stored in each surrogate. Each surrogate can serve at most 10 user
requests at the same time. We assume that each network on average generates much
more than 10 user requests at a time.
Following results depict the performance gains associated with the game theoretical
algorithms for different scenarios. From Figures 4.6 and 4.7 we observe the average
delay experienced by the user requests that are served by the caching infrastructure.
In these examples we assume that the investment amounts of the publishers are equal.
We observe the average latency experienced by the users for each publisher for varying
investments. We noticed that as the investment amounts change, since the caching
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Improvement in Avg. Delay for Pub 1
Improvement in Avg. Delay for Pub 2
Figure 4.7: Improvement in the average latency that user requests observe when a game
theoretical cache allocation strategy is used. Publisher investments are the same.
space is kept constant the total improvement remains the same.
There is considerable improvement by game theoretical CDN architecture as com-
pared to the transparent proxy based caching system. This difference stems from
several factors. First, in the current caching systems, the user request is intercepted
by the proxy. This proxy may not always be the best proxy to serve this request be-
cause of its current load. Thus, if the proxy is overloaded many of the user requests has
to be diverted to the origin servers increasing the latency. Second, the current caching
systems allocate caching space according to such simple popularity based schemes as
LRU or LFU. These algorithms do not consider the network distances of the users
and the origin servers. Although there are other cache management schemes which
attempt to alleviate this problem, still the proposed schemes are heuristics which are
usually far from optimal.
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Game Theoretical Soln for Pub 1
Current Caching Soln for Pub 1
Game Theoretical Soln for Pub 2
Current Caching Soln for Pub 2
Figure 4.8: Comparison of average delays that user requests observe when they are
served by a caching system. Publisher 1’s investment is twice the investment of pub-
lisher 2.
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 depict the performance improvements, when publisher 1 always
invests twice the amount that publisher 2 invests. Again, since the caching space is
limited, we observe that the improvement among the two schemes does not change as
the investments increase.
In Figure 4.10, we investigate the effect of the varying sizes of caching capacities
on the average delay on both the game theoretical solution and the current caching
solution. In the scenario as depicted in Figure 4.10 we assume that the size of the cache
of the second surrogate is half that of the sizes of the other two surrogates. We observe
that, as expected, the average delay decreases as the size of the cache increases, but
the improvement of game theoretical solution remains approximately constant.
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investment of Pub 2
Improvement in Avg Delay for Pub 1
Improvement in Avg Delay for Pub 2
Figure 4.9: Improvement in the average latency that user requests observe when a
game theoretical cache allocation strategy is used. Publisher 1’s investment is twice
















Game Theoretical Soln for Pub 1
Current Caching Soln for Pub 1
Game Theoretical Soln for Pub 2
Current Caching Soln for Pub 2
Figure 4.10: Comparison of average delays as the caching spaces of the surrogates are
varied.
4.5.2 General Equilibrium
In the general equilibrium theory in economics, it is usually assumed that each individ-
ual agent in the system has infinitesimal effect on the overall outcome of the system.
We may use a similar assumption when considering the content delivery problem, since
in the Internet there are many publishers and surrogates and an individual publisher






j−Ccaches be the excess demand function for the surrogate





j−CBWs be the excess demand function
for the surrogate s’s bandwidth resources.
Theorem 8 Existence of Walrasian Equilibrium [41]
A system is said to be in Walrasian equilibrium, if there exists a set of prices pcache
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and pBW such that zcaches (p
cache) ≤ 0 and zBWs (pBW ) ≤ 0 for all s. A Walrasian
equilibrium exists if zcache( pcache) and zBW (pBW ) are continuous and satisfies pcache ·
zcache(pcache) = 0 and pBW · zBW (pBW ) = 0.
The existence condition is satisfied, when the utility functions of the publishers are
strictly increasing. Thus, by definition the combined dissemination-routing game has
a Walrasian general equilibrium.
Then, given an equilibrium state, which is determined from the previous discus-
sions, the CDN can determine a static pricing schedule and announce it to the publish-
ers. The publishers can choose their level of service quality according to their utility
and the pricing schedule. The pricing schedule consists of two parts: the dissemina-
tion cost and the bandwidth cost. The pricing function should depend on at least two
parameters: the total arrival rate and the delay bound.
The requests incoming from different networks are usually non-uniform. We inves-
tigated the effect of this non-uniformity in user request distribution on the total cost.
In the simulation leading to Figure 4.11, we assume that the current system load is
the same as the load used in the last simulation leading to Figure 4.4. The request
arrival rates for a publisher is given by the Zipf distribution with parameter β. That is,
the total arrival rate to the publisher is coming from a user network with probability
given by the Zipf probability considering the index of that network. As β increases
the non-uniformity of the arrival rates increases as well. From Figure 4.11, we see that
the total cost of servicing this publisher is relatively constant. Even if a user network
contributes higher than the other user networks in the total incoming requests, the
cost of service is comparable to the case when all user networks contribute equally in
the incoming requests. We believe that β = 1 corresponds to sufficient skewness as
observed in the Internet.
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Figure 4.12: The pricing schedule.
From this observation, we can design the CDN tariff with respect to the total
arrival rate expected and the delay bound required by the publisher. A sample tariff
is depicted in Figure 4.12. This tariff is determined according to the total cost of
service as given by the partial equilibrium reached by the network, which includes
100 publishers accessing the CDN with 10 surrogates serving 10 user networks. The
request arrival patterns from the user networks are Zipf distributed with β = 0.5.
4.6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter, we considered the routing of the user requests to the most appropriate
surrogates. We developed an algorithm that minimizes the total cost of service, while
satisfying the SLA agreed upon with the publishers. We see that with this formulation,
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the system may not achieve an equilibrium. We further showed that when the sur-
rogate charge the users with the objective of maximizing their revenue, the resulting
game has an equilibrium. We also showed that the overall combined content dissem-
ination/routing game also has an equilibrium. We analyzed the performance of this
game and observed that the improvements suggested by this method are significant.
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Chapter 5
Optimal Nonlinear Pricing for Multi-class
Surrogates
In the previous chapters, we discussed the allocation of the caching and the band-
width resources to the publishers with the objective of maximizing the publishers’ net
utilities. We used market-based methods, where the surrogates charge a fee for unit
resource allocated to a publisher. The publishers can acquire as much resource as
needed to maximize their own benefit in the current market state. The surrogates
update their prices according to the prices of their competitors. Although we have
seen that such a system can lead to an efficient resource allocation, the implementa-
tion complexity may be quite high considering the vast size of the Internet and its
large user population. In this chapter, we pursue the analysis of a system, where the
publishers cannot acquire the exact amount of resources that they would like. The
surrogate offers only a limited number of service classes and the publisher can only
select its service class. Within each service class, the amount of resource allocated to
a publisher varies with the number of publishers subscribed to that class and the total
size of the resource.
We can think of the model used in the previous sections as the Integrated Services
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(IntServ) and the model used in this section as the Differentiated Services (diffserv)
architectures. IntServ and diffserv architectures are developed in the IETF commu-
nity for the provision of QoS in the networks. These architectures are developed for
using priorities in forwarding of the packets through the network to ensure the user
connections conform to specific QoS requirements. IntServ offers more strict service
guarantees by allocating specific bandwidth, buffer, etc. resources at each node. Such
an implementation involves high processing and implementation costs. Meanwhile
diffserv offers less strict statistical service guarantees, where the user’s service may fall
below certain quality level with some probability. Current research efforts in network
QoS has identified the provision of statistical service guarantees as a more practical
approach. diffserv is an architecture developed from this observation. The diffserv
architecture offers limited service guarantees in the form of service classes [12]. The
Olympic service model was proposed as an example of diffserv architecture [39], [5].
In this model bronze, silver and gold service classes are offered to the users. The pack-
ets assigned to the gold service class usually experience lighter load than the packets
assigned to the silver class. However, there are no guarantees for the service quality.
Thus, the load for each service class may be high at certain times resulting in an un-
acceptable performance for an application even with the gold class and at other times
the load may be so low that the same application can satisfactorily run over bronze
class.
In the following, we will explore the same kind of paradigm for the CDNs. We
assume that each surrogate offers a limited number of service classes to the publishers.
The publishers have different smooth and concave willingness-to-pay functions, which
is known a priori by the CDN. For simplicity the CDN assigns each publisher into one
of the few available classes. The surrogates reserve fixed amount of resources for each
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service class. The publishers that subscribe to the same class share the same resource.
Thus, each publisher is assigned a caching space depending on the service class and
the number of publishers subscribed to that class.
This architecture can be easily implemented with the current Internet state-of-the
art. The so-called transparent web caching architecture can be used for this purpose. A
transparent caching system acts as a router, which forwards to the Internet everything
but TCP traffic for HTTP requests (requests with TCP port number 80). The TCP
traffic for HTTP requests are forwarded to one or more caches. Usually, multiple
caching servers are connected to the router for scalability and robustness. Thus, we
may consider the surrogate as a collection of caches. A Layer-4 (L4) switch (or a
router) is placed in front of these caches for routing of user requests to the appropriate
cache. A Layer 4 switch routes packets according to the information available in the
TCP header (and TCP is a transport layer (layer 4) protocol in ISO OSI 7 layer
reference model). Each origin web site is associated with a service class by a priori
subscription agreements. Meanwhile, several caches in a surrogate are assigned to
serve the user requests for the web sites subscribed to a service class. The router
builds two tables for request routing purposes. In the first table, the router keeps the
addresses of the web sites and their associated service classes and in the second table
the association of the caches with these service classes. Upon arrival of a user HTTP
request, the transparent proxy checks the TCP header for the destination address (the
identification for the web site). Then, it determines the service class associated with
the origin server and forwards the user request to one of the caches serving that service
class.
The idea of allocating fixed resources to each service class was previously discussed
in the literature. In RFC 2597, the authors proposed the Assured Forwarding frame-
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work for diffserv, where at each diffserv node a certain amount of forwarding resources
is allocated to every class [39]. However, it is argued in [5] that this method (in the
paper the so called Class-Based Allocation, CBA) leads to desired level of differentia-
tion when the load is uniform among the classes. When the load in the higher priority
classes is larger, this method cannot differentiate the traffic to allow the higher prior-
ity class to receive better service. We also acknowledge that this type of architecture
cannot guarantee a service quality for a service class, since the QoS depends on the
arriving load in that class. However, note that the demand for caching resources is not
as bursty as the traffic in the Internet. Thus, this approach should be acceptable when
the load is relatively stable in the short and long term. In the Internet there are many
web sites which receive a stable stream of user traffic (e.g. CNN, Yahoo, etc.). Our
method can be applied to these web sites for their day-to-day traffic. Rarely, the web
sites receive flash crowds, when the users populate the web site to receive a particular
information. For such cases, we direct the readers to the methods suggested by [46].
In the following, we first describe the system model in detail. Then, we describe the
optimal pricing strategy maximizing the revenue of the CDN. We further investigate
the issues in optimal pricing strategy under competition. Finally we determine a rule
for specifying how many service classes to offer.
5.1 System Model
Assume that each server has an utility function (or equivalently willingness-to-pay
function) P (x) which represents quantitatively the benefit received by the server when
x units of cache space is allocated to the server. It has been shown that users are
most interested in a small portion of the content in the web server [10], [13], [51].
These studies have shown that the web user traffic can be realistically modeled by
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Zipf distribution [88]. From this understanding, we may model the server’s utility
for the caching space as a concave monotonically increasing function. Intuitively, the
server’s utility increases rapidly for the low values of caching space, while the rate
of increase in utility is lower when the portion of the caching space allocated to the
server is high. There are infinitely many server utility functions depending on the
server content, popularity, overall network state and server financial state. In order to
reduce the complexity of estimating individual server utility functions, the surrogate
maps all of the servers into finite number of classes. In general we may assume that
there are K classes of servers with corresponding utility functions Pk, k = 1, 2, . . . ,K
that constitute the population of our economy. The mapping and distinction between
classes can be done based on usage profiles, quality requirements, popularity, etc. The
selection of optimal number of classes is discussed in section 5.4.
The surrogate has its own pricing policy based on which a user is charged a price
C(x) per time unit for an amount of cache space x. A server determines what kind of
QoS (x) it would like based on its own utility function and the pricing policy without
violating the condition P (x) ≥ C(x). That is, the server never pays more than the
benefit it receives from a certain amount of cache space. It is usually the case that
users do not have exact knowledge about their utility for a specific QoS. Rather they
have a budget (or willingness-to-pay) for the service (or product). As long as they do
not exceed their budget, users are willing to receive the highest QoS that is offered.
Thus, a reasonable model is that the user requests the maximum cache space that it
can pay for.
The surrogate assigns a certain portion of the total cache to each service class. Let
bk be the cache space assigned to the k th class of servers. Note that 0 ≤ bk ≤ B, where
B is the total surrogate storage capacity. Each server from the same class receives equal
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caching space. The surrogate has prior knowledge on the server willingness-to-pay
functions and the server access statistics. Let Nk be the random variable representing
the total number of kth class servers accessing the surrogate at an arbitrary instant.
Nk varies in time. When a new web server subscribes to the CDN’s services, the
address of this web site as well as the desired service class is disseminated to the
surrogates. The surrogates partition their caching space among the publishers’ that
are in the same service class. In each partition, LFU, LRU or any other desired cache
replacement policy is used to determine which objects are stored. Thus, bk/Nk is
the random variable representing the amount of cache space available to a kth class
server. The objective of the surrogate is to maximize its expected revenue by selecting
an appropriate pricing policy. In order to ensure fairness among different classes of
servers, we assume that the surrogate charges all users the same amount as long as
their share of cache space is the same. In this chapter, we restrict ourselves with static
pricing policies, where a pricing policy is said to be static, if it does not change with
respect to time or network state. The static pricing policies are usually preferred by
the users due to the predictability of the costs.
5.2 Optimal Strategy for Monopolistic
Surrogate





























The objective function is the total average revenue generated from all classes of
servers given the server access statistics Nk. The surrogate server determines the
pricing policy C(·) and the partition of the overall surrogate capacity among the classes
of servers, {bk}Kk=1. The first constraint guarantees that the cache space allocated to a
server never costs more than the utility it provides to the server. The second constraint
guarantees that the total cache space allocated to each class does not exceed the
available surrogate server capacity B.
5.2.1 Properties of Optimal Pricing Strategy
If random variable Nk takes values in the range [nLk , n
H
K ], the first constraint in (P)
suggests that C(xk) ≤ Pk(xk) for bknH
k
≤ xk ≤ bknL
k
. For easy demonstration purposes
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Theorem 9 Let P = {P1, P2, . . . , PK} be the collection of utility functions of all
classes. Then, for a given cache space partition {bk}Kk=1, the pricing policy C(x) that





min{Pk(x) : Pk ∈ P},
if 0 < x ≤ bu(1)
nL
u(1)






























Proof From the first constraint in (P),






< x ≤ bu(j)
nL
u(j)
and for all k = 1, . . . ,K. Then, C(x) that maximizes the
objective function in (P) is the one that satisfies the above inequality with an equality.
Theorem 9 states that the optimal pricing policy is discontinuous with jumps from
one utility function to another and is monotonically increasing. The pricing function
C(x) has the structure as depicted in Figure 5.1. Theorem 9 suggests that the problem
in hand can be reduced to calculate the optimal sizes of the resource partitions so that
(P ) is maximized. This simplified problem can further be solved if we assume that





   to−pay
x (cache, bandwidth,etc)
Figure 5.1: Sample pricing function.
functions are non-crossing, i.e. Pk+1(x) > Pk(x),∀x and k = 1, . . . ,K. In economics
literature the non-crossing assumption for consumer demand functions is considered
as the conventional approach in calculating the nonlinear tariffs [67]. In the cache
allocation framework this assumption may impose some restrictions on the publisher
request distributions. However, if the publisher utilities are the weighted versions
of their hit probabilities, then this assumption is naturally satisfied. In many cases,
the utility of a publisher is related to the cache hit probability, since for large cache
hit probabilities the number of user requests served at the cache increases, and thus
the user requests do not have to be forwarded to the origin server. This usually
tranlates into lower average delays experienced by the users. Notice that the cache hit
probability for a publisher with Zipf distribution parameter γi and M total objects is
given as
∫ x








)1−γi . Thus, the cache hit probability
curves of two publishers with similar number of available objects do not intersect each
other as long as γi 
= γj , for i 
= j.
Theorem 10 Let Pk+1(x) > Pk(x), ∀x and k = 1, . . . ,K. Assume that random vari-
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able Nk takes values in the range [1,∞) and Nk’s are i.i.d. Then the optimal cache
space partition of surrogate capacity among different classes of servers {b∗k} satisfies
b∗1 < b∗2 < . . . < b∗K .
Proof Assume that b1 < b2 < . . . < bi−1 < bj < bi+1 < . . . < bj−1 < bi < bj+1 <
. . . < bK is an optimal cache space partition, where j > i. Let C(x) be the optimal





P1(x) 0 < x ≤ b1
...
Pi−1(x) bi−2 < x ≤ bi−1
Pi(x) bi−1 < x ≤ bj−1
Pi(x) bj−1 < x ≤ bi
Pj+1(x) bi < x ≤ bj+1
...
. (5.4)
Consider an alternative cache space allocation for the same set of utility functions
{b∗k} where b∗k = bk for ∀k 
= j, i. b∗i = bj , and b∗j = bi. Notice that b∗1 < b∗2 < . . . < b∗K .




P1(x) 0 < x ≤ b∗1
...
Pk(x) b∗k−1 < x ≤ b∗k
...
PK(x) b∗K−1 < x ≤ b∗K
. (5.5)
Compare the objective function in (P) for mth class of servers for both of these
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+ . . . (5.7)
For {bk} to be optimal (as compared to {b∗k}), Pi(x) ≥ Pl(x) for m ≥ l > i, i.e.
each term in equation (5.6) should be higher than each term in equation (5.7). This
contradicts with the hypothesis that Pi(x) < Pj(x) for i < j.
This theorem states that regardless of server access distributions, the higher paying
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class of servers should receive a larger portion of the surrogate capacity. Theorems 9
and 10 together define the pricing function C(x) except for {bk}Kk=1. Note that given
the utility functions Pk(x), k = 1, 2 . . . ,K are concave and continuous, the resulting
objective function in optimization problem (P) is also continuous in bk. We can use
Lagrangian methods to determine the optimal cache partition {bk}Kk=1.
We determined the solution of (P) for logarithmic utility functions where Pk(x) =
αk log(x+1). We assumed, without loss of generality, that αk < αk+1. After straight-
forward but tedious calculations, one arrives at the following set of nonlinear equations
described by (5.8) and (5.9). We assume for simplicity and compactness, the server ac-
cess distributions Nk, k = 1, . . . ,K are continuous. Let µ be the Lagrangian constant,
and f(·) be the identical probability density function of the server access distributions












































[αj − αj+1] log(bj + 1)
= µ, j = 1, . . . ,K. (5.8)
K∑
k=1
bk = B. (5.9)
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Figure 5.2: Change of average surrogate revenue with respect to surrogate partition
for varying β.
5.2.2 Numerical Results
We have investigated the solution of this Lagrangian optimization problem numeri-
cally. It is reasonable to assume that the number of servers accessing the surrogate
at a particular time is Poisson distributed. In our analysis, we assume that server
distribution is continuous and can be represented by Rayleigh distribution, which can
be considered as the continuous interpolation of Poisson distribution. We determine
the optimal cache partition by simultaneously solving the set of nonlinear equations
described by (5.8) and (5.9).
In Figure 5.2, we observe the effect of increasing number of servers requesting
service on the optimal partition of a surrogate with 2 service classes. The server utility
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functions are P1(x) = 1 · log(x + 1), and P2(x) = 2 · log(x + 1). β is the parameter
for Rayleigh distribution that roughly corresponds to the mean number of servers
requesting service at the current slot. In Figure 5.2, we notice that as β increases, the
optimal partition tends to give a larger portion of the surrogate server space to the
service class with higher utility. In fact, beyond some certain β, the optimal policy
for a surrogate is to serve only the service class with higher willingness-to-pay. This is
reasonable considering that when the average number of servers requesting service is
high, the probability of receiving no server request is low. If we can assure that there
is always going to be a higher paying class of servers in the system, then it is optimal
to serve only higher paying class of servers. This type of behavior may result in a
system where less popular servers are unable to get any caching service. Fortunately,
in real world the number of users belonging to each service class is not identically
distributed. Servers with higher willingness-to-pay or that are highly popular are
always much fewer.
Table 5.1 depicts the optimal cache partition and the revenue corresponding to
this partition for a monopolistic surrogate with capacity 100 units. There are 2 service
classes with willingness-to-pay functions P1(x) and P2(x).
2 classes b1 b2 revenue
β = 1 33.8678 66.1322 10.6477
β = 3 10.3475 89.6525 28.2833
β = 5 6.9070 93.0929 37.6394
β = 10 4.0336 95.9665 52.2785
Table 5.1: Optimal cache partition for a monopolistic surrogate when there are 2
service classes.
In Table 5.2 we investigate the optimal cache partition when there are 3 service
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classes. Servers from each class request service with respect to Rayleigh distribution
with parameter β. The capacity of the surrogate is still 100 units.The willingness-to-
pay function for each service class is P1(x) = 1 · log(x + 1), P2(x) = 2 · log(x + 1) and
P3(x) = 3 · log(x + 1). It is interesting to note that when there are more than two
service classes, the classes other than the highest paying service class receive roughly
the same amount of cache space as β increases. Thus, it may be better to serve the
lower paying service classes in a single service class. For this model, we may conjecture
that implementing a two service class system is sufficient to achieve a near-optimal
result.
3 classes b1 b2 b3 revenue
β = 2 10.2091 13.1847 76.6062 28.0497
β = 3 8.9656 9.3079 81.7265 41.6741
β = 5 6.3136 6.3557 87.3312 57.1166
Table 5.2: Optimal cache partition for a monopolistic surrogate when there are 3
service classes.
5.2.3 Discussion of the System
Even though it may occur very rarely, this scheme may result in low utilization of the
surrogate capacity. Notice that our results depend on the fact that there is always at
least one publisher per class. If this is not true, then the cache space allocated to a
service class remains unused. This leads to under-utilization of the surrogate capacity.
For a very popular surrogate server this may not cause any problem. One method
to circumvent this problem is to reduce the number of different classes, and thus to
reduce the probability that there is no publishers for a class. It is true that higher the
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number of classes, lower the surrogate utilization is. However at the same time, lower
the number of classes, lower the surrogate revenue is, since we have to represent all
publishers with very few number of willingness-to-pay (utility) functions. Hence, the
partitioning of the publishers into multiple surrogate classes is an additional design
constraint in the maximization of surrogate revenue. We offer a possible solution to
this problem in the last section. However, notice that these cases occur rarely in a
caching framework, where the demand for the resources is much more stable than
the actual Internet traffic as considered in the flow control problem. Furthermore, in
the caching framework the contracts are usually much longer term, which ensures the
stability.
5.3 Optimal Surrogate Partition Under Competition
In this section we consider the optimal pricing strategies of two competing surrogates.
Let C1(x) and C2(x) denote the pricing functions of the two competing surrogates.
Each surrogate offers in total B units of cache space to their servers. N11 and N12
denote the number of servers from each class accessing the surrogate 1, while N21 and
N22 denote the number of servers from each class accessing the surrogate 2. Notice
that N11 + N
2




2 = N2, where N1 and N2 are the random variables
corresponding to the number of servers accessing the surrogates at a particular time
from each class. b11 and b
1
2 denote the cache space reserved for each service class on
the surrogate 1, and b21 and b
2
2 denote the cache space reserved for each service class
on the surrogate 2.
The strategy for a server is to subscribe to a surrogate and to select a class that
maximizes its share of the cache space. When many servers access a particular sur-
rogate, the surrogate will get congested and the share of cache space for each server
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will become less. In that case at later time slots some of the servers will switch to the
competing surrogate. An equilibrium, when the number of servers switching from one
surrogate to another is the same exists, when the same class of servers receive equal































. At equilibrium the optimal pricing
strategy for provider i = 1, 2, given the pricing strategy of the competing provider
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| bi1 + bi2 = B
}
. (5.10)
Assume that surrogate 2 is the new entrant to the market. Initially, surrogate
2 determines a pricing strategy by solving the above equation when the surrogate 1
has implemented optimal monopolistic pricing strategy. However, provider 1 will take
action as provider 2 announces its pricing strategy. Both surrogates will iteratively
re-calculate their strategy given the strategy of its competing counterpart. An im-
portant question is then, whether a pair of pricing strategies exits when neither of
the two providers are willing to change their strategy unilaterally. In game theory
such a situation is called Nash equilibrium. In the following theorem, we show that
abovementioned ‘pricing war’ leads to a Nash equilibrium.










































(2B − b∗1) < 0, (5.12)
where f(b) = E [NC(b/N)].













2 is a surrogate partition that is
not a Nash equilibrium. Then, without loss of generality surrogate 1 can increase its
revenue by choosing a surrogate partition b
∗
1




f(b∗1 + ∆) +
B − b∗1/2 − ∆
2B − b∗1 − ∆
f(2B − b∗1 − ∆). (5.13)
The net increase in the revenue of provider 1 is
b∗1/2 + ∆
b∗1 + ∆





B − b∗1/2 − ∆
2B − b∗1 − ∆
f(2B − b∗1 − ∆) −
1
2
f(2B − b∗1). (5.14)










(2B − b∗1). (5.15)
It is clear that if b
∗
1
2 is a Nash equilibrium, then the expression in equation (5.15) is
less than zero.
This theorem suggests that at equilibrium servers receive a share of surrogate server
space as if there is a single surrogate offering a larger surrogate capacity. Servers’ share
of cache space increase, since a competing surrogate introduces additional surrogate
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server space. The surrogates’ revenues increase, since there are fewer servers subscrib-
ing to each surrogate at any particular time resulting in increased charges per server
received due to higher per server cache share. Thus, the result of the competition of
different surrogates is the same as peering.
We tested this result for log-utility functions through numerical analysis. There
are 2 classes of servers with willingness-to-pay functions P1(x) = 1· log(x) and P2(x) =
2 · log(x). There are two classes of service, and servers of each class request access
to the surrogate with respect to Rayleigh distribution with parameter β = 3. The
optimal surrogate partition, when there is a single surrogate offering in total 200 units
of cache space to the servers is b1 = 22.43 and b2 = 177.57. We observed that in
12 iterations we approached the Nash equilibrium solution suggested by the previous
theorem.
5.4 Optimal Number of Partitions
Previous sections discussed the optimal size of the partitions and the pricing strategy
when the number of user classes are given. In this section, we investigate the optimal
number of resource partitions maximizing the revenue. In order to maintain tractabil-
ity, we assume a log-utility function U(θ) = θ log(k(q) + 1), where k is the dis-benefit
of observing congestion q at the resource, θ is the preference of the user for the lack
of congestion. q can also be interpreted as the number of users sharing the resource.
Let p log(k +1) be the subscription price for the resource. In order to reflect the range
of preferences in the simplest manner, we assume that there is a continuum of users
whose θ parameters form a population with distribution f(θ). Notice that according
to our utility function, users with inelastic preferences will have high values of θ. The
users, whose θ parameters form a population distribution which is distributed on the
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iteration provider 1 provider 2
0 [10.3475 89.6525] -
1 [10.3475 89.6525] [12.4239 87.5761]
2 [10.7223 89.2777] [12.4239 87.5761]
3 [10.7223 89.2777] [12.1263 87.8737]
4 [10.9582 89.0418] [12.1263 87.8737]
5 [10.9582 89.0418] [11.9388 88.0612]
6 [11.1270 88.8230] [11.9388 88.0612]
7 [11.1270 88.8230] [11.7974 88.2026]
8 [11.2429 88.7571] [11.7974 88.2026]
9 [11.2429 88.7571] [11.7014 88.2986]
10 [11.3206 88.6794] [11.7014 88.2986]
11 [11.3206 88.6794] [11.4938 88.5062]
12 [11.4853 88.5147] [11.4938 88.5062]
Table 5.3: The optimal cache space partition of competing surrogates. At each itera-
tion one of the surrogate updates its cache space partition.
interval [0, 1] according to distribution f(θ).
The congestion k is a function of total number of users in the system. Let, with-
out loss of generality, p1 < p2 denote the prices of two equal size, C, partitions of
the resource. Notice that users with preference θ < θ1, where θ1 log(k(
∫ θ2
θ1




f(θ) dθ) + 1) = 0 do not subscribe to the resource since the net benefit is
negative. Notice that this relationship requires that p1 = θ1. Similarly, the users with
preference θ1 < θ < θ2, where θ2 log(k(
∫ θ2
θ1
f(θ) dθ) + 1) − p1 log(k(
∫ θ2
θ1




f(θ) dθ) + 1) − p2 log(k(
∫ 1
θ2
f(θ) dθ) + 1), subscribe to the lower priced
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f(θ) dθ p1 log(k(
∫ θ2
θ1
f(θ) dθ) + 1) +
∫ 1
θ2
f(θ) dθ p2 log(k(
∫ 1
θ2
f(θ) dθ) + 1).
We search for the conditions for which the profit by offering two classes of service
is higher than offering a single class of service. Consider the case when p1 = p2.
Notice that this case corresponds to offering a single class of service. If we can find
another solution with higher profit, then we show that it is optimal to offer multiple
service classes. We show that by considering the change in profit for a given p1 = θ1 =
constant is positive when p2 is increased, i.e. dπ > 0, when dp2 > 0.
For p1 = p2,
dπ
dp2
= −f(θ1)dθ1dp2 θ1 log(k(
∫ 1
θ2




















f(θ) dθ) + 1),







f(θ) dθ) + 1) dp2. (5.16)
Thus, we see that for dp2 > 0 dπ > 0, if k(
∫ 1
θ2
f(θ) dθ) > 0. A good choice for the
congestion function k is k(q) = Cq , where q is the number of users subscribed to the
resource, and C is the limited resource capacity.
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We should also note that such congestion function k(q) = Cq may result in the
provision of a single service class if the users have a more conventional utility function
U(θ) = θ · Cq and charged a fixed price p. This result is due to the following lemma,
which also identifies a case where the result of Chander and Leruth [16] does not hold.
Lemma 4 Let U(θ) = θ ·k(q)−p. The congestion function k(q) can be any real valued
function satisfying:
1. k is at least twice differentiable;
2. k(q) > 0 and dk(q)dq < 0 for all q > 0;
3. k(0) < ∞.
If k′(q)q = −k(q), then it is not optimal to sell the same product with different qualities.
Proof Assume that there are two products priced at p1 and p2, and without loss of
generality p1 > p2. The users with preference factor θ2 are indifferent of subscribing
to product 2 or not subscribing to any of the products. Notice that the users with
preference θ > θ2 do not subscribe to any of the products. That is,
U(θ2) = θ2k(q2) − p2 = 0. (5.17)
On the other hand users with preference θ1 are indifferent of subscribing to either
product 1 or product 2. That is,
U(θ1) = θ1k(q2) − p2 = θ1k(q1) − p1. (5.18)
From equations (5.17) and (5.18) we can determine p1 and p2 as,
p1 − p2 = θ1(k(q2) − k(q1)), (5.19)
p2 = θ2k(q2). (5.20)
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Our objective is to determine the set of prices p1, p2 that maximize the total profit
π = p1q1 + p2q2. Noticing that p1 and p2 are functions of the market partitions θ1 and
θ2, we consider our optimization over θ1 and θ2. Let f(θ) be the number of users with
θ preference. Then q1 =
∫ 1
θ1
f(θ) dθ and q2 =
∫ θ1
θ2
f(θ) dθ. Profit is
π = θ2k(q2)q2 + θ1(k(q2) − k(q1))q1 + θ2k(q2)q1
= θ2k(q2)(q1 + q2) + θ1(k(q2) − k(q1))q1. (5.21)




Taking the derivative of π with respect to θ1, and equating to zero, π′ = 0,





+(k(q2) − k(q1))q1 + θ1(k(q2) − k(q1))q′1
+θ1(k′(q2)q′2 − k′(q1)q′1)q1 = 0. (5.22)
π′ = (θ2(q1 + q2) + θ1q1)k′(q2)q′2 − θ1k′(q1)q′1q1
+θ2k(q2)(q′1 + q
′
2) + (k(q2) − k(q1))q1
+θ1(k(q2) − k(q1))q′1 = 0. (5.23)
Since k′(q)q′ < 0 from assumptions, we see that the first term in (5.23) is negative while
the second one is positive. The third term is equal to zero, since q′2 = −q′1 = f(θ1).
The fourth term is negative since p1 > p2 and thus k(q1) > k(q2). The last term in
(5.23) is positive, since q′1 is negative. As it stands we may find q1, q2 solving (5.23)
such that q1 
= q2.
If k′(q1)q1 = −k(q1), then second term cancels with the last term, resulting in
π′ = (θ2(q1 + q2) + θ1q1)k′(q2)q′2
+(k(q2) − k(q1))q1 + θ1k(q2)q′1 = 0. (5.24)
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All terms in (5.24) are negative, which suggests that no interior point solution exists.







f(θ) dθ)+1) dp2 > 0, for all dp2 > 0. This result can be extended
to more than two classes by using a recursive argument. For example, assume that
there are 3 classes and and show that dπ > 0, when p1 = p2 = p3 and θ1 and θ2 are
kept constant.
This result is a special case as discussed by Chander and Leruth in [16]. The au-
thors have shown in [16] that a profit maximizing monopolist will charge the maximum
number of different prices, and hence offer the maximum number of sub-networks with
different qualities. However, in [16] the authors used a simple pricing policy where the
users of each class are charged a constant price regardless of their quality of service.
In our work we considered a nonlinear pricing policy within each service class.
We have shown that given an available resource capacity, it is a revenue maximizing
strategy to offer as many service classes as possible. However, as discussed previously,
another consideration for a resource provider is the utilization of the resources. Note
that a low resource utilization means waste of investment for the unused portion.
Thus, a resource provider would like to maximize its utilization as well. In Figure
5.3 we show the change in the resource utilization for increasing number of service
classes. In this experiment, we assume that user requests arrive according to Poisson
distribution with rate λ. Note that in this experiment λ is the aggregate arrival rate
for all types of publishers. The probability of a publisher subscribing to a service class
is the same probability for all classes. The capacity of each service class is assumed
to be the same. We notice that as the number of offered service classes increase,
the utilization decreases exponentially. However, as the arrival rate increases the
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Figure 5.3: Utilization of resource for increasing number of service classes.
utilization increases as well. Thus, more number of classes can be offered efficiently
when more users subscribe to the system.
A reasonable objective for the surrogate is to maximize its profit, which is the
revenue gained by providing differentiated services less the investment required to
provide the necessary resources. By multiplying the ordinate of Figure 5.3 by an
appropriate weighting factor, which may depend on the unit costs of resources, the
surrogate can estimate its investment. Then, by using the optimal pricing strategy
discussed in the previous section, the surrogate can choose an optimal number of
service classes maximizing its profit.
5.5 Conclusions and Future Work
In this chapter we analyzed a pricing scheme for the extension of diffserv architecture
in the CDNs. In this architecture, the publishers (web sites) subscribe to one of the
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few service classes offered by the surrogate. Within each service class, the amount
of resource allocated to a publisher depends on the number of publishers subscribed
to that class as well as the amount of resource the surrogate allocates to that service
class. We determined the optimal nonlinear tariff for the surrogate maximizing its
revenue. The optimal tariff follows the willingness-to-pay functions of the publishers,
but has jumps at the points denoting the size of resource allocated to each class. At
each jump the price function increases to the willingness-to-pay function of the higher
service class. Thus, the problem reduces to determining the optimal partition of the
resource among service classes. We also analyzed the system under competition and
observed that under competition the individual resource allocations converge to the
optimal allocation set by a monopoly with an aggregate resource size of two competing
surrogates. Furthermore, we described a method for determining the appropriate
number of service classes depending on the received revenue and network efficiency.
It should be clear to the reader that these results are applicable not only to the
pricing and allocation of caching resources in surrogates but also to any other con-
gestible resource allocation problems such as the sharing of bandwidth at the edges
(ISPs) and in general for pricing of commodities whose quality varies with demand.
An immediate extension of this work can be thought of by considering different user
objectives such as the maximization of net benefit instead of the maximization of the




Conclusions and Future Work
In this dissertation, we investigated the dynamics of resource allocation in content
delivery networks. Our motivation for this study was to analyze the effects of high-
level user decisions on the lower level network performance. Notice that the Internet
has evolved from a research-oriented academic network into an infotainment-oriented
commercial network. Academic, business and personal users form the large population
of the Internet. Not all users value the Internet services the same, because of the
importance of the applications that use these services. For example, a user accessing
from home may use the Internet for leisure and thus is not always willing to pay for high
quality Internet experience. Meanwhile, a company may use the Internet to connect
its LANs at several geographically distant locations, and require high quality service
for effective continuation of its business. In this framework the user performance is
usually better measured with respect to a utility function.
In this work, we considered the CDNs because they are inherently working at the
application layer, and thus are directly effected with the user decisions. Meanwhile,
the CDNs are basically network caches and thus they reduce the network congestions
and user delays. In this sense, we can measure the effects of high-level user decisions
with low level network metrics such as user latency.
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In the development of our results we divided the content delivery problem into
distribution and routing sub-problems and investigated them separately but jointly.
We showed that each sub-problem has an equilibrium given the solution of the other,
and this solution is optimal if the equilibrium is unique. The distribution and routing
problems appear to be similar expect that caching space is allocated in the distribution
and bandwidth is allocated in the routing sub-problem. We determined the optimal
strategies of the publishers and the surrogates, where each agent non-cooperatively
and selfishly tries to maximize its benefit. By relying on these strategies we showed
that the resulting game has an equilibrium. We further determined the uniqueness
condition for the equilibrium, which appeared to be dependent on the total amount of
publisher investments and the size of the resources. We noticed that if the available
resource size is not large and if the publisher investments are not high, we achieve a
unique equilibrium.
We also determined the system optimum solution, where the objective is to maxi-
mize the total system utility (or minimize total average user delay). We observed that
the non-cooperative game representation is applicable for the distributed solution of
the system optimization problem as long as the publishers are willing to pay the pos-
sibly very high investment amounts associated with this solution. Upon observing the
very high prices associated with the system optimum solution, which may diminish
any benefit received by using the caching architecture, we determined a sub-optimal
solution where publishers select their investments to maximize their net profit. The
publisher profit is given as the total utility received (which may be interpreted as the
weighted sum of the average user delays) reduced by the total investment amount.
We noticed that our sub-optimal investment strategy can increase the net benefit
significantly without reducing the total system utility more than 5%.
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We later discussed the joint distribution and routing game and showed that this
game has an equilibrium as well. We studied the performance of the combined game
as compared to current transparent proxy caching implementations numerically and
observed that the improvements are more 50%.
The framework for distribution and routing is similar to an auction and allow the
publishers request any range of quality of service. Meanwhile, such a quality of service
may not be needed for most and only several classes of service is sufficient in many
cases. We explore this possibility in the last chapter, and showed the optimal pricing
schedule for this case. We also determined the condition under which the service
provider chooses to offer different quality of service classes.
There remains much work to be done in this infant subject. The questions remain
to be answered range fromthe design of different pricing schemes to solving imple-
mentation issues. An interesting question that can be answered in this framework is
determining the optimal locations for the surrogates. Although in real networks the
choices for placing a surrogate are quite limited, it is clear that a surrogate placed at
a wrong location will not improve the system-wide performance any good. Our model






Proofs of Lemmas in Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 1














where γ is the Lagrangian constant. From Karush-Kuhn-Tucker Theorem we know
that the optimal solution is given by ∂L(x)/∂xji = 0 for γ ≥ 0.
∂L(x)/∂xji = β
j
i (1 − αi)
(
xji
)−αi − γpj = 0,
xji =
(












Now, optimal xji can easily be determined.
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Proof of Lemma 2
As illustrated in Figure 3.4, the surrogate’s revenue decreases when the price is ei-
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i (pj) = Cj. This concludes the proof.





































































1 − (1 − α)pjγj
) (A.2)
Notice that the denominator in eq. (A.2) is similar to the left hand side of eq. (A.1).
Remember that 0 < α < 1. Hence, p−1/αj
(






























































Near-optimal publisher investment strategy
In this appendix, we show the derivation of the near-optimal investment strategy. For
the sake of simplicity we determine our results for αi = 0.5,∀i.









Assume that pj are the set of prices at the equilibrium. As for the key assumption of
our derivation, we assume that for a small change in investment amounts, the change





ik/pk can be considered as constant. This assumption is







































































Then, the optimal investment can be calculated by the simultaneous solution of












































, and Ui =
√
Bi, then the optimal solution is the solution to

















i γijBi = Cj,∀j.
A simple near-optimal investment strategy determines the investment amount Bi
from Eq.(B.1) for the equilibrium prices.
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